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1. Abstract  
Existing empirical literature on political business cycles focused primarily on 
developed economies before it began considering a basket of both developed and 
developing economies. This study seeks to expand the existing literature by pursuing 
two objectives using Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) as locations 
of the study. The first objective is to examine the presence (lack thereof) of political 
business cycles in the BRICS trading block for the period 1994 to 2014. The second 
objective of this study is to examine the effect that political business cycles (if present) 
have on the sovereign credit ratings that the BRICS countries receive from credit rating 
agencies. Credit rating agencies make use of a combination of political, social and 
economic factors to determine the ratings assigned to various countries. The credit 
ratings assigned to countries by these agencies play an important role to international 
lenders as they use these ratings to make decisions on the interest rates they charge to 
different sovereigns. Based on the first objective, the findings from this study show that 
there is weak evidence of electorally timed interventions in BRICS economies over the 
period of 1994 to 2014. These findings are inconsistent with the predictions of political 
business cycle theory which suggests that incumbent politicians take advantage of the 
information gap between them and voters by implementing economic changes closer to 
an election year in order to exude competence and to increase their chances of 
reelection. However, further analysis based on the second objective shows that elections 
in BRICS countries are not viewed negatively by credit rating agencies. Hence, unlike 
in other developing countries, the BRICS countries are not likely to be downgraded 
during or after election years. Consequent to these findings, this study supports the 
notion that the government’s influence on the fiscal and monetary policy variables 
across BRICS is not concentrated nor overly exerted around election periods and that 
the BRICS countries’ institutions are regarded by rating agencies as independent and 
up to relevant international standards.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Political business cycles (PBCs) are business cycles that manifest because of the manipulation 
of policy tools (monetary and/or fiscal) by incumbent politicians with the goal of stimulating 
the economy just prior to the elections in order to improve their own and their party’s chances 
of re-election. In this vein, politicians turn to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in the 
lead up to elections because of their short term benefits such as tax cuts, falling unemployment, 
falling interest rates, increased government spending etc. The problem with such measures is 
that they have contractionary effects on the economy in the medium to long run, right after 
elections. The new government finds itself having to counter the effects of the prior 
expansionary measures by allowing interest rates to rise, cutting spending, raising taxes and 
slowing the growth of money supply amongst other measures. Elections are therefore 
considered to bring about an artificial boom and bust cycle in the economy in line with the 
regularity of elections (Johnson, 1998).  
PBCs can be observed through changes in macroeconomic variables such as output, 
unemployment and inflation, which are also susceptible to government’s actions. As explained 
above, these cycles occur as a result of the manipulation of either fiscal or monetary policy. 
The cycles that are attributed to manipulation of fiscal policies are often referred to as Political 
Budget Cycles while those that are caused by monetary policy manipulation are called Political 
Monetary cycles. However, the focus of this study is not on the two aforementioned cycles 
separately, but on the PBCs which are caused by the incumbent government’s manipulation of 
both fiscal and monetary variables. To begin with, it is important to note that PBC theory can 
be classified into two fundamental models, namely opportunistic PBC and partisan PBC. 
Opportunistic PBC theory states that expansionary measures are used by incumbents in an 
opportunistic manner before an election to increase their chances for a re-election. The Partisan 
PBC theory, on the other hand, states that macroeconomic fluctuations influenced by 
politicians are dependent on the objectives of the leaders’ party which could be either left or 
right wing (Drazen A. , 2001).   
Owing to the role that PBC can play in an economy, it is important to understanding how 
prevalent PBC is in the five-member states of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(BRICS) in order to provide evidence of how high or low political risk is in the BRICS bloc. 
Political risk is one of the factors alongside social and economic factors that Credit Rating 
Agencies (CRAs) factor into account when determining the credit ratings that they allocate to 
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sovereigns. As a result, this study seeks to examine if the factors that cause PBC also have a 
significant contribution towards the credit ratings that the sovereigns receive.  
1.1 Limitations from prior research 
 
Research on PBC dates back to 1975 when the traditional PBC models were introduced and 
defined by Nordhaus William, an economist and professor at Yale University. His model 
formed the foundation for PBC research and got analysed further, hence, leading to the present 
two models of PBC theory mentioned above and which are discussed further in this study. 
Before delving into too much detail on the two models of PBC theory, this study conducted an 
extensive review of literature to determine the limitations that could be present in this field. 
These limitations were then used to formulate research objectives, questions and motivation 
for this current study. Some of the notable limitations observed during an examination of the 
extant literature are presented below as follows: 
 Earlier PBC research focused mainly on individual and groups of developed economies 
and the motivation for that choice of countries was that their macroeconomic and 
political data was readily available and well documented for use. Most of the developed 
economies that were investigated had and still have well established electoral systems 
and institutions in place that were designed to anticipate and counter electorally induced 
behaviour that could lead to PBCs (Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976; Tufte, 1978). 
 A substantial amount of prior research is based on individual countries. However, 
although this is of informative value to the country’s policy makers, it does not inform 
them of how the country fairs in relation to its peers or trading partners in a bloc, 
cooperation or monetary union. An insight into how a group of countries with similar 
characteristics and economic capabilities could foster policy choice that is beneficial 
not only to a single country but also to the trading partners within the union or bloc 
owing to the importance of policy stance by one country within a globalised market.    
 Studies that looked at a group of countries focused on blocs of industrialised economies 
with strong institutions such as OECD countries (Alesina, 1987), Euro zone nations, 
the G8 and the G20 with scant research focusing on the developing and emerging 
economies. Therefore, a focus on the large and key players of the global economy 
ignores the small and upcoming players, many of whom experience the effects of 
political manipulation in their already weak institutions and poor electoral systems.  
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 Existing research shows that, it was only until the 1990s that some studies began to 
cover developing countries and at this point, the focus was on countries in Latin 
America and Asia. Their role in the global economy began to catch the attention of 
academics (Block, 2002). Coincidentally, literature with a specific focus on African 
nations followed as democratization began to spread and dictatorships, military rule 
and apartheid regimes were halted (Block, 2002).    
 Prior research also began to look at a mix of both developed and developing economies 
but without a clear set of criteria for their choice of countries. The shortcomings of such 
analysis are that it provides findings that would lack concrete informational value due 
to being heavily weighted and biased by the data and output of some countries more 
than others.   
 No prior research to this study was found to have been conducted with a direct focus 
on PBC across the BRICS trading bloc. Prior research that included the five-member 
nations of the BRICS did so alongside other countries. A possible explanation for this 
gap in research, especially for South Africa (SA), could be that SA is a nascent 
democracy, which made it a less desirable location to conduct research on.  
 Studies that looked at a combination of developed and developing countries, did so for 
a considerably finite time frame (2 to 10 years) which may not have been sufficient to 
provide in depth and substantiated findings. This served as a motivation for this current 
study to adopt a 20-year time frame. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
The objectives that this study aims to achieve are to: 
 Contribute to the existing literature on PBCs in emerging markets, specifically 
economies that are very similar to BRICS member nations or that collaborate with them 
the most, be it for trade or other reasons.  
 Enhance the understanding of political risk as explained through the evidence or lack 
thereof of PBC in BRICS from both a single country’s perspective and as a group of 
countries.  
 Clearly illustrate the various models of PBC and present the literature upon which they 
are founded. This also entails, zoning in on the model(s) that apply to each of the five 
countries and how their electoral systems are affected by the specific models. 
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 Identify the macroeconomic variables that are of most significance in providing 
evidence of PBC in the BRICS member nations and to the bloc through statistical 
analysis. 
 Scrutinize political happenings and policy changes effected in member nations in years 
leading up to elections over the period from 1994 to 2014 and determine their 
contributions (if any) to the presence of PBCs. 
 Analyse a set of macroeconomic variables via a statistical model with the aim of 
determining how significant they are as factors that CRAs use when assigning credit 
ratings for the trade bloc members.  
 Compare the findings from the statistical analysis to actual ratings that were allocated 
by CRAs. This will provide insight on how macroeconomic variables that are affected 
by policy changes and electoral cycles can also be vital in determining the credit ratings 
assigned to the sovereigns 
 Inform future policy changes and political actions, specifically pertaining to election 
periods based on the findings of this study. Obtain lessons that the member nations can 
learn from and perhaps use in aiding them to design policies that will strengthen the 
bloc in future. 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
This study aims to answer two broad questions, which are then split into various sub questions 
as listed below. 
1. How strong is the evidence of political business cycles amongst BRICS member nations? 
 1.1 Which model of PBC is applicable to the (specific) countries in the BRICS bloc?  
 1.2 What type of government regimes and electoral systems alike are in place in the 
countries that  make up BRICS and how do they contribute to the presence of PBC?   
 1.3 What factors and political happenings over the period of 1994 to 2014 may have 
contributed to the increase in political risk across BRICS? 
 1.4 How have the member states’ governments been dealing with monetary and fiscal 
policy  changes especially in periods leading up to and after general presidential elections? 
 1.5 How much impact do the PBC effects in a member nation have on the other 
countries on the bloc and how does this affect the overall risk of BRICS as a trading bloc?  
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2. How significant is the role of political risk as explained through PBC evidence in influencing 
the credit rating action for BRICS? 
 2.1 What is the rating history for BRICS over the period 1994 to 2014?  
 2.2 What have been the determinants of ratings that the CRAs have been using in 
allocating ratings to BRICS? 
 2.3 How significant are the variables that provide evidence for PBC in BRICS in 
determining the ratings for the member nations?  
 2.4 What is the difference between assigned sovereign ratings by CRAs and ratings 
obtained through statistical analysis? What are the reasons for the observed difference?  
 2.5 What influence do the member nations have on the ratings that either receives and 
what effect does this have on BRICS as a trading bloc?  
1.4 Research Motivation 
 
The motivation for this study is manifold. Firstly, the political landscape in emerging markets 
especially Africa is one that is continually scrutinized not only by the continent’s residents but 
also by the rest of the World. For example, the African political landscape transformed between 
1989 and 1994, with thirty-five sub-Saharan Africa countries re-introducing multiparty 
elections and as such bringing political openings to around five hundred million people 
(Cheeseman, 2014). Democracy brings with it a broad range of outcomes to any nation, a 
reasonable number of them being destructive than others. However, democratisation is also 
associated with a lot of risk given that past observations of political turmoil are caused by 
power struggles (Cheeseman, 2014). Evidence provided by Cheeseman shows that the power 
struggles are most prevalent during election periods, with 80% of African elections being 
associated with eruptions of war crimes, ethnic clashes and the loss of many lives (Cheeseman, 
2014). Political leaders contesting election outcomes tend to either use their current positions 
of power to strong arm their opponents or rally their supporters to cause chaos as a sign of 
disagreeing with the results. This behaviour not only has a high human cost, in certain countries 
more than others, but it also has a detrimental effect on the economic welfare of the nations. 
Economic growth is hampered as investors react negatively to these mishaps, hence, leading to 
large capital outflows and minimal foreign direct investments flowing into countries facing 
these power struggles. Owing to a high prevalence of these mishaps in many developing and 
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emerging economies, this study aims to examine how the BRICS countries have been dealing 
with the transition of power issues and the measures they have in place to effectively manage 
and minimise the negative effects that these could have on their economies if mishandled.  
Secondly, it is important that governments of sovereigns get an understanding of the impact 
that their political actions have on the people they serve. Politicians are viewed to be self-
centred people and the electorate often overlooks this point and are swayed by the numerous 
and at times, empty promises that they make when seeking their votes. Shedding light on the 
outcomes of electoral mismanagement will be informative to political leaders and drive 
innovation from their end when seeking office. BRICS member countries have an unpopular 
feature, discussed below, that is likely to come in the way of them realising economic 
equivalence to that of other developed and developing economies. The prominent feature 
within the BRICS countries, is that wealth is concentrated in relatively few hands, individuals 
or families. Hence, as economies continue to grow, there will be a pressing need for even 
distribution of wealth to the majority of the population who are impoverished and governments 
will be expected to spearhead this change. One efficient means of achieving this redistribution 
of wealth would be through policy change, a tool that governments have substantial control 
over and which they tend to manipulate for their benefit. Following this view, this study should 
provide guidance to the BRICS countries towards designing an agreement on policy changes 
if they seek to maximise on the potential of the economic bloc (Financial Times, 2006).  
Thirdly, citizens of a sovereign are never fully aware of the immense power that is possessed 
in the democratic right to vote. People tend to be very short sighted and do not ponder on the 
impact that their leaders will have on the economy and the nation in the medium to long term. 
This lack of foresight is what politicians take advantage of when elections come about. Voters 
need to be informed of the consequences that politicians’ actions have on the state of the nation 
be it positive or negative. They need to be provided with as much information as possible to 
inform their decisions and consequently their choice of leaders. The findings from this current 
study will provide insight on what changes voters should look out for in the lead up to elections 
and after so as to assess the competence of the candidates and newly elects respectively. 
Fourth, highlighting the effects of PBC should drive governments to make efforts to reduce the 
controversy around elections. This could be through technology innovations that are driven by 
social entrepreneurs such as devices to register voters and transmit election results from the 
polling stations to an online platform in real time. This approach should be considered with 
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caution as it is the very same governments that may use their position to find ways to go around 
the innovations to get an edge over their opponents and misdirect voters. Moreover, this study 
will enable us to identify if there are any noticeable changes in PBC evidence in between the 
time frame before BRICS was formed and then after. It will offer insight on whether there was 
a behaviour change in BRICS leaders as a result of getting into an economic bloc or if their 
actions got worse as they now have access to greater political influence and more financial 
resources.   
Fifth, there is continual emphasis and demand for good governance reforms by international 
donors. Governments seeking funds from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank (WB) need to exhibit economic and political stability. Unfortunately, depending on how 
manifested PBCs are in some countries, governments find themselves impeded by limited 
access to financial backing or high interest rates for any external debt that they are provided 
with. Some governments go to the extent of looting state funds to fund election campaigns as 
was observed in Kenya during the period from 1992 to 1997 and this ended up costing the 
country up to about 10% of its GDP (Cheeseman, 2014).  It is through this study that 
governments can gain insight on what it is that they need to do to address PBC and as such 
lower their political risk levels and open up channels of funding and financing partnerships.  
Sixth, an aura of scepticism exists around the validity of credit rating action by agencies such 
as Moody’s, S&P and Fitch Ratings. A major reason behind this is the fact that these agencies 
get their fees from sovereigns and companies that pay them for credit ratings. A conflict of 
interest arises as countries could stop paying for the CRAs’ services if they believe that the 
rating they receive is not justifiable (Hanusch and Vaaler, 2013). Conversely, more countries 
will pay for the ratings because of the numerous benefits associated with a positive outlook or 
upgrade to their credit rating. This study will play a role in eroding the scepticism by trying to 
prove that CRAs do indeed consider the influence of political risks on the creditworthiness of 
a sovereign and that their findings are close to or in line with what the findings of this study 
reveal. Furthermore, this study should strengthen the current relationship between CRAs and 
sovereigns, the result of which will enhance the international investor community’s reliance on 
the ratings when making investment decisions.  
Seventh, BRICS as a trading bloc of emerging markets has only been in existence since 2010 
when South Africa joined as the final member. Extensive research has been conducted on the 
member countries separately for evidence of PBCs and in some cases the member states were 
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included in a larger pool (ranging from ten to twenty-five) of countries. The political risk of 
the bloc has not been studied from the PBC point of view and this study will give insight to the 
weightings that each member brings to the overall risk of the bloc given different government 
regimes, electoral systems and periods of independence. It will inform decision making going 
forward especially on ways in which electoral reform can be enhanced in countries where it is 
lacking and lessons that can be learnt from member states where PBCs have been maintained 
at a minimum. Agreements can be made that result in consequences for facilitating PBCs and 
as such not only heightening an individual country’s political risk but also that of the bloc. 
Ratings for the bloc will be vital for the success of initiatives that they have in place such as 
the New Development Bank, should they need to borrow funds from International lenders and 
prove that that institution is credible and attractive to investors.  
1.5 Contribution to the body of knowledge 
 
This study contributes to the existing body of literature in many ways. Firstly, this study 
depends on and validates the historical information available on the types of government 
regimes that prevail among BRICS. It distinguishes each of them by their features and explains 
thoroughly the role that these government systems have played in the social and political 
welfare of the respective countries. In addition, it identifies the differences and similarities in 
varying government systems as well as the disadvantages and advantages of either. It also 
provides clarity about which government system is dominant in BRICS and the effect it has 
had on the bloc.  
Secondly, complimentary to understanding the government systems present in BRICS, this 
study also highlights the electoral systems that are in place in the countries under study. It 
focuses on how elections were conducted over the period 1994 to 2014 and how authentic they 
were and free from foul play. The most important elections for the purpose of this study are 
general presidential elections because they represent a greater shift of power and that they tend 
to be more contested though it is worth mentioning that in countries such as SA and India, the 
stakes tend to be high even in local government and Lok Sabha elections respectively. In this 
view, this current study contributes immensely to the growing literature on elections in BRICS 
by investigating and documenting methods and tactics that politicians (those in power and their 
opposition) used over the said time period to win over voters. This study also provides a critique 
on electoral systems that lack independence and prevent voters from fully exercising their 
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democratic right. In the same light, the study highlights electoral systems that are efficient and 
whose results have yielded in little to no disputes and successful handover of power. 
Third, this study contributes to literature on policy action with specific focus on fiscal and 
monetary policy. It makes inferences based on notable fiscal and monetary policy changes that 
were conducted by governments in periods leading to and after general elections between 1994 
and 2014. The study makes the foresaid possible through its reliance on the observed changes 
in a number of macroeconomic variables that are indicative of the fiscal and monetary policy 
changes implemented in the BRICS countries. The timing of these changes in relation to 
elections will also be of interest for the purposes of this study as it paves way for the possibility 
of PBCs.  
Fourth, the pooling together of the contributions discussed above extends the existing PBC 
literature to economies that have previously received little to no attention from researchers. 
Furthermore, this study utilises a specific theoretical framework that identifies the type of PBCs 
that are applicable to BRICS countries. It does so by building on the existing literature that has 
identified mixed evidence of PBCs in member states for different time periods. In this vein, 
this study informs literature on which macroeconomic variable changes best provide evidence 
of PBCs in BRICS. It further illustrates if there is a correlation between political behaviour by 
incumbents during elections and economic stability changes that come into effect, before and 
after elections.  
Fifth, this study also leads to a better understanding of the determinants of credit ratings that 
are used by CRAs such as Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. It focuses on a mix of social and economic 
variables that would have been analysed with the aim of finding evidence of PBCs in BRICS. 
The goal is to observe which of the above-mentioned factors have a significant impact on the 
rating levels that the countries receive. This enables this current study to then conduct an 
analysis, which entails the inputting of these variables into a model and getting its own set of 
credit ratings for BRICS. Thereafter, this study conducts a comparison between the ratings 
found in this study to those issued by CRAs (factoring in that this study does not use a wide 
range of macroeconomic variables as they do). This comparison enables this study to prove the 
hypothesis that credit ratings as awarded by CRAs are indeed justified and are an accurate 




1.6 Overview of the study 
 
In order to achieve the set objectives of this study, the study is organised as follows: Chapter 2 
presents an overview of the BRICS bloc and its member countries. The chapter focuses on a 
mix of political happenings, social and economic activities that the countries experienced over 
the period of 1994 to 2014, the factors that could be instrumental in providing evidence relating 
to PBCs. In addition, chapter 2 discusses the government systems, electoral protocols and 
procedures that are in place in the BRICS as this will shed light on the extent to which political 
leaders and the government influence economic growth and stability. Chapter 3 provides the 
theoretical framework around PBCs as well as identifying the models that apply to the BRICS 
bloc. Chapter 4 presents a review of the literature on PBC theory, evidence of PBC and 
determinants of credit ratings. Chapter 5 explains the methodology that is applied, while 
chapter 6 presents a discussion of the findings of this study. Thereafter, chapter 7 provides a 
















2.1 Background to the BRICS Countries 
 
The BRICS is an association that comprises of economies that have repeatedly featured in the 
WB’s list of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world. It initially started with 
four members namely Brazil, Russia, India and China and by then the association was known 
as BRIC, a term that was coined by Jim O’Neill in a publication (O'Neill, 2001) and which 
became official after the foreign ministers from the four states met in 2006 and later conducted 
the first BRIC summit in 2009. BRIC became a topic of discussion over time and Goldman 
Sachs released a series of economic papers whose projections were that the BRIC would be the 
most dominant economies by the year 2050 (Times, 2006). O’Neill (2001) predicted that 
through economic development and political cooperation between BRIC members, there would 
be a shift in global economic power from developed to emerging economies who were 
exhibiting double digit growth figures and had spectacular balance of payment figures. In 2007, 
a Goldman Sachs report produced a list called the Next 11 (N-11) economies comprising of a 
mix of developing economies and newly industrialized economies. The countries that made up 
this list are Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam (Eghbal, 2008). These countries were seen to be similar to 
BRIC in terms of population sizes, strong economic growth rates driven by manufacturing, 
importing and exporting, improving business environments and regulation, rapid urbanization, 
technology adaption and attractive for foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. There has been 
speculation as to which of the N-11 economies would be a likely addition to BRIC but that has 
yet to materialize (Wilson & Stupnytska, 2007). 
  
Despite BRIC comprising of strong emerging markets, there was no African representation. 
South Africa’s formal admission to the association was officiated in December 2010 leading 
the acronym, BRIC to be changed to BRICS. The South African President, Jacob Zuma 
attended the first BRICS summit in 2011, which was also the first-time leaders of all five-
member countries convened together. South Africa’s addition was considered a political move 
more than anything given the small size of its population and economy in comparison to its 
BRIC counterparts. However, it was  a welcomed addition because South Africa is the largest 
and most developed African economy and therefore it was aimed that it would give the bloc 
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access to other African economies (with emphasis being on SADC), a four continent scope, 
global influence and trade opportunities (Why is South Africa included in the BRICS?, 2013).  
 
The BRICS bloc makes up about 43% of the world’s population, has 30% of the world’s GDP 
and contributes up to a 17% share in world trade (Bawa, Bohler-Muller, Fikeni, Zondi, & 
Naidu, 2014). It has had eight summits since its formation in 2009 that were held in member 
countries to foster the commercial, political and cultural cooperation among the nations on 
issues such as climate change, energy, poverty, terrorism, agriculture and development. 
Besides the abovementioned issues, there are certain matters the summits had to discuss and 
state their stance on. This study shall now look at the major takeaways from the summits held 
up to 2015.  
 
The first BRIC summit of 2009 held in Russia was right after the global financial crisis and it 
focused on advancing reform of international financial institutions and addressing the need for 
a stable and more diversified international monetary system. BRIC called for cooperation 
among energy states and support for the poorer countries that were hardest hit by the financial 
crisis (BRIC, 2009). The second summit held in 2010 in Brazil discussed global governance, 
recognizing the role of bodies such as the G20 in International economic coordination, the 
United Nations (UN) in dealing with global challenges and threats and emerging economies in 
championing the resumption of global economic growth. Furthermore, the BRIC pledged to 
contribute funds to the IMF alongside the G20 so that they could have more resources to supply 
needy developing countries (BRIC, 2009).  
 
The third summit held in 2011 took place in China and it was the first ever BRICS summit with 
South Africa as an official member of the economic bloc. This summit reiterated the call for 
the comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council in order to make it more 
representative of all the participating members and to serve them accordingly. It also 
highlighted the possible risk that excessive volatility in commodity prices would pose to the 
recovery of the World economy. In addition, future nuclear energy projects were seen to be a 
pivotal area in the energy of BRICS members and that the energy projects needed thorough 
vetting. In a similar vein, there was also a call for further infrastructural development in Africa 
and cooperation in areas such as science, technology and innovation (BRICS, Sanya 




The fourth summit was held in 2012 in India at a time when the recovery of the world economy 
faced the challenges of market instability in the Eurozone and the escalation of the Arab Israeli 
conflict in the Middle East. This summit pointed out how excessive volatility in capital flows 
and commodity prices due to the euro crisis were trickling down to emerging economies and 
how that would hamper growth and development. The BRICS called on the WB to give greater 
priority to flows of development finance to emerging and developing economies. Furthermore, 
this summit led to the mooting of the formation of a New Development Bank (NDB) among 
BRICS as well as the delegation of the respective finance ministers to examine the feasibility 
and viability of such a project. There was emphasis on the commitment to achieve Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) especially amongst developing countries as well as for member 
states to jointly work towards combating public health challenges faced by most BRICS 
countries. The first ever BRICS Report by India was published in 2012 and its focus was on 
synergies within the BRICS economies (BRICS, 2012).  
 
The fifth summit was held in 2013 in South Africa and it stressed on the need for the provision 
of support to African countries by developed economies as they go through their 
industrialization process. In this meeting, the BRICS’ promised to provide closer cooperation 
with African countries. In the same meeting, further investigation and progress on the 
likelihood of a development bank for BRICS was discussed and it received further support 
from the proposal of a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) valued at about US$ 100bn. 
The CRA was meant to provide a financial safety net for BRICS. The summit also reiterated 
the bloc’s concern on issues such as Afghanistan’s stability, the Iranian nuclear issue and slow 
progress in the Middle East Peace Process and deteriorating situations in Syria, Central African 
Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (BRICS, 2013).  
 
The sixth summit was held in 2014 in Brazil and it started on a high note with the signing of 
an agreement that led to the establishment of the NDB for infrastructure and sustainable 
development projects. Respective finance ministers had to work out the modalities of its 
operationalization. There was also a conclusion of agreements relating to BRICS Export Credit 
and Guarantees Agencies as well as Innovation within the BRICS Interbank Cooperation 
Mechanism. The role of State Owned Companies and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in 
the economy as creators of wealth and jobs was highlighted. In addition, an effort was made 
on how to deal with tax administration issues that could negatively impact state owned 
companies and small and medium sized enterprises. However, there was also a concern 
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expressed over unresolved issues in Iraq and Ukraine alongside some of the nations mentioned 
in the previous summit. The summit also held a discussion on the importance of education, 
fighting corruption and cybercrimes, agricultural cooperation, promoting Information and 
Communication Technologies in a bid to foster economic growth and social inclusion among 
BRICS and other developing economies (BRICS, 2014).  
 
The final summit of potential relevance to this study took place in 2015 in Russia. It began by 
recognizing that there are persisting risks to the global economy, majority of which the previous 
summits had covered extensively. The BRICS was nearing the commencement of operations 
with the NDB and the leaders called for it to cooperate closely with new financing mechanisms 
such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The BRICS also called upon the UN to 
deal timeously with the sovereign debt restructuring process, which was becoming a barrier to 
access of funds and economic development for most of the developing economies. There was 
also a call for cooperation in preventing and developing responses to emergencies caused by 
natural disasters, terrorist attacks or other unprecedented occurrences. The leaders reiterated 
their concern about the escalated armed conflict in Libya, South Sudan, DRC, Burundi and 
CAR. BRICS welcomed feedback from a vast range of sub councils that met before or during 
the duration of the summit to address specific issues directed to them (BRICS, 2015).  
 
Despite that the BRICS are associated with high risk, they are closely monitored by investors 
that are looking for high growth investments. Their high-risk nature led to a Morgan Stanley 
analyst in 2013 to coin the term “Fragile Five” referring to the economies of Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey that were getting too reliant on FDI to finance economic 
growth (Thomas Jr., 2014). The problem with such reliance is that should the Federal Reserve 
decide on fiscal tightening then the lines of credit available to these nations would decline, a 
situation that was argued to aggravate these economies, as they shared a common feature in the 
form of running large current account deficits (Grater, 2017).  
 
Apart from the brief overview of the origins of the BRICS and its objectives over the years, the 
ensuing sub sections of this chapter present the defining characteristics of the BRICS countries 
as well as events that could have influenced their levels of political risk over the period of 1994 
to 2014. Therefore, the next sub sections provide an overview of events that could have 
influenced the levels of political risk in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 





2.2.1 Government Type 
Brazil is a decentralized federal and constitutional republic with three branches of the 
government, namely the executive, legislative and judicial. The president serves a four – year 
term with a chance for re-election for another 4 years. Its congress is comprised of the Senate, 
which is made up of 81 members who are elected for 8-year terms, and the House of Deputies, 
made up of 513 members elected for 4-year terms. The number of deputies directly relates to 
the population of the representatives from various states. The representatives come from 15 
different major political parties, which represent everything from democrats to communists 
(Bonnal, n.d.).  
2.2.2 Electoral System 
Brazil has four types of majority elections: absolute majorities elect the president, governors 
and mayors while senators are elected by simple majorities. In the event of no absolute majority 
in the first round in cities with more than 200 000 voters, a runoff is required between the top 
two candidates until one gets 50 percent plus at least 1 vote. For the purpose of this study, the 
focus is on the presidential elections. The president has his/her respective vice president elected 
on unified slates.  
Election Day is a national holiday in Brazil with the first round elections being held on the first 
Sunday in October and runoff second elections on the last Sunday of October. Election laws 
are detailed and dictate the fulfilling of certain requirements. One is that all candidates that 
hold executive positions should resign six months before the election and that only candidates 
officially represented by a registered political party may run for election. Political parties elect 
their presidential candidates in national conventions.  
Voting is a right and duty in Brazil and thus registration and voting are compulsory for all 
between the ages of eighteen and seventy. However, the constitution of 1988 lowered the 
voting age to sixteen, increasing the turnouts for elections in Brazil. Generally, the voter turnout 
in Brazil is as high as more than 85 percent. In addition, the electoral system has transitioned 
from using individual paper ballots for each office (before 1966) to unified single ballots (until 
1996) to electronic voting which was used in 1996 in 51 of Brazil’s largest cities. In 2000, it 
became the first country to hold elections completely by an electronic system and it has 
remained at the forefront of the electronic voting movement (Lin & Espinoza, 2007).  
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Candidates’ names are randomly listed on the ballot for majority elections and the voter is 
required to mark the respective box. In a presidential election, each Brazilian gets to vote for 
the president, the voter’s state governor, one or two senators, one federal representative and 
one state representative (Utsumi, 2014). Voter education in this case is paramount as some 
voters were not aware of the abovementioned and as such they would only vote for the first 
two and leave the rest blank. In terms of campaign resources, there used to be few restrictions 
on campaign finances in the past but that changed in 1994 after the passing of Law No. 8,713 
that legalized contributions from individual businesses towards campaigns and the issuance of 
electoral bonus receipts to contributors. Alongside the new law that was put in place, a further 
requirement was that parties and candidates were required to submit to the electoral court a 
detailed balance sheet that listed the contributors and expenses incurred. These reports were 
supposed to be timeously made public and analyzed in the press so that the voters were well 
informed. To make sure of this, the 1994 constitution was revised in May 1994. The revision 
led to the reduction in the presidential term from five to four years, the unification of the terms 
of the president, state governors and congress and to the limitation of their re-election to only 
one subsequent term (The Electoral System, 2016). 
In terms of part representation, Brazil has a highly fragmented political party system, which 
has seen no fewer than eighteen parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies since 1990. 
However, there are four major parties namely: The Workers' Party (PT), the Brazilian Social 
Democracy Party (PSDB), the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the 
Democrats (DEM), previously the Liberal Front Party (PFL). The PT is a left wing, PSDB a 
centre-to-centre-left party, PMDB is a centre party while PT is considered right of centre 
(Alvarez-Rivera, 2015).   Table 1 below shows that the presidential elections since 1994 were 









2.2.3 Election History over the period from 1994 to 2014 






















2002 Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva 
The Workers' Party 
(PT) 
22.4% No 
2006 Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva 
The Workers' Party 
(PT) 
21.6% Yes 
2010 Dilma Rousseff The Workers' Party 
(PT) 
12.2% No 




2.2.4 Brazil’s policy changes and macroeconomic outlook over the 1994 to 2014 period 
Brazil was going through a period of hyperinflation in the lead up to the 1994 elections. A 
condition termed as “short-termism”, which turned out to be most detrimental to the poor who 
could not protect themselves against inflation. With an overvalued Real and Brazil having high 
interest rates in place, it was hard to attract foreign capital and this resulted in the deterioration 
of their fiscal accounts. In response to rampant inflation, the Plano Real was launched in 1994 
as part of a strict anti-inflation approach that was put in place by the new president, Henrique 
Cardoso. This policy led to a decline in inflation from about 2477% in 1993 to just under 7% 
in 1997 (The echoes of 1994, 2014).  
 
In 1999, the Real was floated and the government began a transition from an exchange rate 
targeting regime to an inflation-targeting regime with the goal of price stabilization. This was 
followed by tightening of monetary and fiscal policy, which led to the implementation of the 
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Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2000. The reasoning for the law was to control public spending, 
which is a contractionary measure that was effected right after the completion of elections in 
1999 – a move which according to PBC theory is expected post-elections. In addition, the IMF 
approved a loan package to assist Brazil with the debt crisis and to supplement the 
government’s efforts to adjust fiscal and external imbalances (IMF, 2007). Economic growth 
in this period was driven mainly by the commodity super-cycle, mineral exports (particularly 
iron ore) to China (one of Brazil’s largest export market) and agricultural commodities that did 
well on the back of both domestic and international demand (Dwyer, 2014) 
 
However, in the build up to the 2002 elections, there was an increase in economic tensions as 
investors were concerned about Brazil’s energy crisis and the possible default on the national 
debt (Holland, 2015). The Worker’s Party (PT) secured electoral victory and got into office. 
Lula da Silva, the new president, was swift to calm investors by vowing to maintain the current 
macroeconomic policies (The Economist, 2015). As a result, Brazil’s economic state improved 
greatly over the period from 2003 to 2006. During this period, the government implemented 
cash transfer programs, higher minimum wages and facilitated credit growth, which all drove 
consumption and led to higher stocks of foreign reserves, a large primary surplus and a reduced 
public debt to GDP ratio (Loman, 2014). In addition to that, the middle class of Brazil grew 
exponentially due a social security program called Bolsa Familia- a program that led to “the 
rise of a new, consuming middle class” (Dwyer, 2014).   
 
The Brazilian economy did relatively well until the 2008 global financial crisis which led to a 
deceleration of global economic growth, specifically in China. The deceleration in the global 
economic growth led the Brazilian government to enact countercyclical policies during this 
crisis period when most countries were implementing contractionary policies necessary to 
preserve confidence. The Brazilian government used quasi-fiscal expansionary policies to re-
ignite growth by “intervening in industries through price controls and tax adjustments and 
extending credit in public banks” (Dwyer, 2014), amongst a host of other measures.  However, 
there is no surprise that the government implemented these measures as this was a time leading 
up to the 2009 elections. As a result of the measures put in place, the recovery of commodity 
prices and discovery of oil reserves in the Atlantic Ocean - an increase in GDP was observed 
from 0.9% in 2009 to 7.5% in 2010. The GDP growth rate was, however, unsustainable and 
thus ended up declining to 2.7% in 2011 (Loman, 2014). The decline in the GDP growth rate 
observed was likely due to the central bank raising interest rates to bring economic growth to 
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a sustainable rate and avoid hyperinflation. However, the move did not yield the desired result 
as it instead led to a further deterioration of the GDP growth to 0.9% in 2012 (Loman, 2014) . 
 
In 2013, an increase in inflation led to a new round of monetary tightening, as interest rates 
were raised to levels above 10% p.a., which in turn restricted investment and growth prospects 
for 2014 due to the high cost of borrowing. The growth prospects were hurt further by the 
worsening labour market in Brazil which was caused by a mix of lack of job creation and the 
falling of the labour market participation rate due to more young people pursuing full time 
education (a result of the Bolsa familia program of 2003). As a result of these events, Brazil 
was downgraded by the rating agencies with S&P highlighting that fiscal deterioration was the 
main factor that led the rating agency to assign Brazil its lowest investment grade rating in 
March 2013 (The Economist, 2015).  
 
Brazil’s leadership and their high level of government intervention was blamed for the country 
being on the verge of a recession by the end of 2014. This was evidenced by its levels of public 
sector debt that was up to about 60% of GDP as well as a widening gap between government 
spending and savings rates. As a result of the aforementioned, economists had to revise down 
their 2015 growth projections for Brazil especially given that its fundamental economic 
indicators were beginning to partly resemble those of developed economies and straying from 
the higher growth rates associated with healthy developing economies (Giavazzi, Goldfajn, & 




2.3.1 Government Type 
After the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1991, Russia began 
adapting to self-rule as the Russian Federation (adopting its own constitution in 1993).  The 
Federation has three branches of government namely: executive, legislative and judicial. The 
President represents the executive branch and is voted in for a six-year term, up from four 
years after the constitution was changed in 2008 (Gilbert, 2012). The president holds significant 
power in that he serves as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, appoints the prime 
minister and can dissolve parliament. Russia does not have a vice president and in the event 
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that the president cannot perform his/her role then the Premier (chair of Government) takes 
his place. The president cannot serve more than two consecutive terms in office.  
The legislative branch (considered subordinate to the executive branch) is the Federation’s 
Assembly consisting of a 178 seat Federation Council and 450 seat State Duma representing 
the 21 Russian Republics and 66 independent regions and territories. There are a number of 
active political parties in Russia (CIA, 2017).    
2.3.2 Electoral System 
It was not until 1996 that Russia had to elect its head of State in a democratic election. Before 
then, elections were not free and voting was limited to a privileged few. Currently, it is possible 
for any Russian citizen over the age of 18 to vote. Presidential elections are a direct vote by the 
people based solely on popularity. If no candidate attains an over 50% majority, then there is a 
runoff election between the two top candidates with the most votes. Electoral associations 
(political parties), voters (through collecting two million voter signatures) or election blocs 
(made up of two or more electoral associations) are the various ways to nominate Russian 
presidential candidates (Gilbert, 2012).  
There is a multiparty system present in Russia although it does not play a major role in 
presidential elections where only one candidate can win. As such, it creates incentives to 
consolidate alliances and narrow the field before the vote, which pushes the system to mirror 
bipolarity or majoritarianism system. These alliances come in play during the runoff elections 
as then voters have to pick between two candidates (Herrington, n.d.). When Vladimir Putin 
came to power in 2000, he put policies in place that led to a significant drop in the number of 
parties with nationwide influence to compete in general elections. By 2007, there were only 10 
parties with such capability in comparison to 43 in 1995, 26 in 1999 and 23 in 2003. Four 
elements were over time put in place to make sure that there is a limited number of parties and 
a dominant ‘party of power’. First, there was efficient manipulation of the parties and electoral 
law to limit opportunities for smaller parties and hamper the creation of new ones. Second, 
there was presidential support and affiliation to certain parties. Thirdly, mass media (national 
broadcasting) was forced to focus on respective ‘suitable’ parties and lastly, limits were set on 
the regional aspect of power (regional governors are selected by the president and not directly 
elected) (Mikkel, 2006).  
The main political party in Russia is United Russia (UR), founded in April 2001 as a coalition 
of several political parties. It reveres itself as centrist although it is perceived to be a creation 
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of Vladimir Putin to retain power. The main opposition party is the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation (KPRF) that “remains attached to Marxist-Leninist dogma and advocates 
State ownership of the economy” (Russell, 2014, p. 1).  Other parties that still hold seats in the 
Duma (lower house in the Assembly) are A Just Russia (JR) with a social democratic agenda, 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), which is neither liberal nor democratic though its 
leader has extreme right-wing views and Yabloko (a liberal party) (Darlington, 2016).  
Some of the factors that affect the organization of elections and the voting system in Russia are 
its huge territory that spans a number of time zones and an uneven distribution of people across 
various regions that have differing levels of infrastructure and transport development. There 
are about 105 million voters who go out to the 90 000 voting centers set up during election 
time. The electoral commission requires labor of up to one million staff to prepare and conduct 
transparent democratic elections (ACE Project, 2016).  The use of modern technology was 
deemed necessary to reduce complications during elections that could lead to dire political and 
economic consequences.  
In 1994, Yeltsin, who was by then the president of Russia, passed an order for the establishment 
of an election State Automated System (SAS). The use of the first component of this system 
was in elections of deputies to the State Duma in 1995 and in 1996 for the Presidential elections 
(with 80% of voters using it). The main function of the system was to prepare voter lists and 
summarize preliminary results of voting (ACE Project, 2016). In 2009, there was a call for an 
upgrade to the system in order to enhance transparency of the electoral process and strengthen 
public oversight. In 2010, a state program for introducing electronic vote counting was 
launched in order to establish a secure network for data transfer and storage and to construct 
an infrastructure for remote voting via mobile phones for those that could not make it to polling 
stations. A major technological innovation that followed was the Optical Scan Voting System 
that scans and records all the information on a voter’s ballot onto a Russia-wide data network. 
The switch to an optical scan voting system increased processing speed and it also prevented 
possible fraud at polling stations. By 2011, the SAS had served more than 20000 election 
campaigns at various levels without significant technological failures (Morozov, 2011). Voters, 
especially the older generation, and the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Russia still 
trust the paper-based system but they have not been opposed to the integration of new 
technologies in the process of monitoring results. The end goal is towards the adoption of 
mobile phones as part of the whole election process and recognizing the most favored means 
of communication amongst majority of the citizens (Harris & Vincent , 2009). 
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2.3.3 Election History over the period from 1994 to 2014 
Russia has held five presidential elections in the period from 1994 to 2014 and these are 
presented in Table 2 below.  
 






Party  Margin of Win Incumbent 
Contesting 





United Russia (UR) 23.12% No 
2004 Vladimir 
Putin 
United Russia(UR) 57.6% Yes 
2008 Dmitry 
Medvedev 
United Russia (UR) 53.2% No 
2012 Vladimir 
Putin 
United Russia (UR) 45%` No 
 
2.3.4 Russia’s policy changes and macroeconomic outlook over the period from 1994 to 
2014 
The 1990s represented a period of major transitions for Russia. The government was in the 
process of realigning the central planned economy to a capitalist order based on markets, free 
enterprise and private property. The first measure put in place was the mass privatization of 
state entities – which resulted in the transfer of shares in most of the government entities to 
managers, workers and the public. According to a 2014 Global Wealth Credit Suisse report, 
privatization led to the creation of Oligarchs (Russia’s richest 1%) who got ownership of 30% 
of the nation’s personal assets. This caused huge disparities in income and living standards 
among Russians (Stewart, 2013) and because it was a transitional phase, no one paid taxes nor 
did the government have an idea of how much people earned. A recent study found that by end 
of 2015, the amount of offshore wealth amassed by wealthy Russians stood at a staggering 75% 
of the national income with half of it not expected to return to Russia (Novokmet, Picketty, & 
Zucman, 2017). Other economic reforms administered alongside privatization were sharp 
reductions in government spending and targeting outlays for public investment projects, 
defense, producer, and consumer subsidies.  
In 1996, an election year, president Yeltsin embarked on a political campaign to balance the 
budget through a “loans-for-shares” program. The program involved turning over valuable 
natural resource enterprises to major businesspersons in exchange for loans to the government 
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– this can be considered to be an electorally timed measure. By the end of 1997, South East 
Asia was hit by the Asian Financial Crisis, better known as the “Asian Contagion.” This crisis 
saw the devaluation of currencies by about 38% in Thailand, South Korea, Japan and Indonesia. 
The Asian Contagion also sparked an outflow of capital in Russia that was partly driven by 
oligarchs stripping assets from the companies they had recently acquired from the government. 
The outflow of capital coupled with drop in demand for crude oil and low oil prices led Russia 
to end its fixed exchange rate regime in 1995. The consequential effect of abandonment of the 
fixed exchange regime was that the Ruble got devalued four times and several banks declared 
bankruptcy in 1998 (Smirnov, 2015).  
The government instituted a flat 13% income tax in 2001, a move viewed as a policy reversal 
to enable the government to generate revenue from the extremely wealthy beneficiaries of the 
privatization that took place between 1991 and 1995 (Novokmet, Picketty, & Zucman, 2017).  
The years that followed until about 2004 saw Russia’s economy recover and it was driven 
mainly by pretax profits of large oil and resources companies. Market competition coupled 
with responsible macroeconomic policy (maintaining a balanced budget) saw increased 
economic efficiency and a steady growth in foreign currency reserves. The four years after 
2004 saw Russia experience a rise in household expenditures that was a product of fast growing 
personal income and a large expansion of personal credit. Economic growth was further 
boosted by oil prices that were still increasing as was production in Russia (Aven, 2013).  
The global financial crisis of 2008 struck in the same period that Russia was having an election 
and modifying its tax administration so that it could appropriately tax residents based on their 
respective income levels. The effects of the two events were evident in 2009 when GDP growth 
slumped from 5.2% in 2008 to -7.8% in 2009 (World Bank, 2009). This low growth was short 
lived as economic growth recovered in 2010 and 2011, largely due to the recovery in oil prices. 
2012 and 2013 were periods of dismal stagnation due to above average inflation rates (6% – 
8%) that prevented the Central Bank from lowering the relatively high interest rates (Aven, 
2013). The high interest rates made the investment climate for private businesses worse as 
banks were lending at very high costs. The Russia economy was still paternalistic – this means 
that the population was constantly depending on the government to help and support them. This 




The Russian government came under pressure to cut down its military spending so as to reduce 
its trade deficit that was burgeoning (Korsunskaya & Fabrichnaya, 2014). The budget came 
under more constraint due to dropping oil prices alongside sanctions from the EU and US for 
Russia’s role in the Ukrainian crisis. The effects of this was that very little FDI made its way 
into Russia and capital outflows increased, amounting to about 7% of GDP  (Smirnov, 2015). 
Credit rating action in Russia only began when the federation began transition towards modern 
capitalism. The country’s sovereign rating was speculative but got bolstered into investment 
grade on the back of prudent fiscal and monetary policy, debt rescheduling and a decline in the 
disparity between the political and economic discourse. This upward trend was not without any 
challenges, with the most notable one being in 1998 when Russia defaulted on its sovereign 
debt, as did other countries affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Rising oil revenues, a 
growth of foreign reserves and large capital inflows brought the sovereign rating levels back 
up though they posed new challenges such as corruption. Economic dependence on the oil and 
gas sector posed a risk to the sovereign rating levels as it raised the nation’s susceptibility to 
event risk (Moody's, 2017).  
2.4 India 
 
2.4.1 Government Type 
India is a federal democratic republic that has one national government that exists 
independently over several other smaller state governments. The government is divided into 3 
distinct arms namely, executive, legislature and judiciary. The President is the head of state 
while the Prime Minister is the head of government in India. The president’s role is largely 
ceremonial while full governing authority vests with the prime minister who is a presidential 
appointee. The appointment of the Prime Minister follows a designation made by the legislators 
in the lower house of the Indian Parliament, better known as the Lok Sabha (House of the 
People) (GlobalEdge, 2016). 
 
2.4.2 Electoral System 
 
The democratic system in India states that any citizen over the age of 18 can vote in an election 
unless they are deemed to have an unsound mind or have been convicted of certain criminal 
offences. All who are eligible and registered to vote are included in the Electoral roll, which 
gets updated annually to add those that turn 18 on 1 January and remove those that may have 
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passed away over the past year. The electoral roll of all 620 million voters in India was 
computerised in 1998 and it is provided to national and state parties for free after the annual 
revision and is also available for sale to the general public. The computerised electoral roll is 
cross-linked to Electors’ Photo Identity Cards (EPIC) that India had ordered to be made in 1993 
as a way to improve the accuracy of the electoral roll and to prevent electoral fraud (ECI, 2016).  
 
The elected members of the Vidhan Sabhas (legislative assemblies), Lok Sabha and Rajya 
Sabha (Council of States) elect the President. The President serves for a period of 5 years and 
can stand for re-election. “A formula is used to allocate votes so that there is a balance between 
the population of each state and the number of votes assembly members from a state can cast, 
and to give an equal balance between State Assembly members and National Parliament 
members” (ECI, 2016).  Should there be no clear winner, a system is used to eliminate the 
losing candidates and their votes transferred to top candidates until one gains a majority. The 
Vice President is elected by a direct vote by all the nominated and elected members of the Lok 
Sabha and Rajya Sabha (ECI, 2016).    
 
The Lok Sabha is the main legislative body along with the Rajya Sabha. The Lok Sabha is 
limited to 550 elected members whose election happens using a first-past-the-post electoral 
system. The country is split into constituencies, voters can cast one vote each for a candidate, 
and winners are the ones that get maximum votes. Elections for the Lok Sabha take place every 
five years unless the President dissolves it and calls for a general election before the end of five 
years. Any Indian citizen registered as a voter and over the age of 25 can contest elections to 
the Lok Sabha (ECI, 2016).  
 
The Rajya Sabha are elected indirectly and not by the entire voter population. Each State 
Vidhan Sabha using the single transferrable system elects them. This system is used to elect 
233 members while the President is responsible for nominating another 12 as representatives 
of literature, science, art and social services. Rajya Sabha members can serve for six years. Any 
Indian citizen registered as a voter and over the age of 30 can contest elections to the Lok Sabha 
(ECI, 2016).  
 
The Vidhan Sabhas are directly elected bodies whose duty is to carry out the administration of 
the government in the 28 States of India. Election into this assemble is also carried out using 
the first-past-the-post electoral system after the states and unions are split into single-member 
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constituencies. The assemblies vary in size with the largest one having about 403 members and 
the smallest with 30 members. Elections for the Vidhan Sabhas take place after every 5 years. 
Any Indian citizen registered as a voter and over the age of 25 can contest elections to the 
Vidhan Sabha (ECI, 2016).  
 
The Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) manufactured around 1990 were used for the first 
time in 16 Assembly constituencies and at the general legislative assemblies’ elections that 
were held in 1998. Since these machines run on a battery, they have an advantage that they are 
usable even in areas without power connection and thus all across India. All the votes recorded 
are stored in the memory of the Control unit of the EVM. The other advantage is that these 
machines made voting counting quicker and brought about savings by way of cost of paper, 
printing, transportation, storage and distribution. As of 2014, there were 814m voters registered 
in India to vote at 930 000 polling stations. The Electoral Commission of India monitored the 
use of EVMS in polling stations. Amazingly, voters in India have an option to reject all 
candidates using a “none of the above” button on the machines (BBC, 2014). 
 
2.4.3 Election History over the period from 1994 to 2014 
India has held five presidential elections in the period from 1994 to 2014 (Venkatraman, 2015).  
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2002 Dr APJ Abdul 
Kalam 
Bhartiya Janta Party 79.2% No 











2.4.4 India’s policy changes and macroeconomic outlook over the period from 1994 to 
2014 
India considers itself as a “Democratic Market Economy”. The government monopoly prior to 
1994 had a negative effect on efficiency and growth than a private sector monopoly would have 
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due to the ease with which regulatory capture occurred. The year 1994 kicked off with the full 
convertibility of the current account after an integrated market-oriented exchange rate was 
introduced in 1993. The result of this conversion was a rise in industrial production, exports of 
agricultural products and non-oil imports. India saw a decline in its current account deficits, 
external debt was shrunk by about $300m Dollars and foreign currency reserves increased by 
about $19.5 billion (Virmani, 2005). The country’s GDP growth rate got to a peak of 7.8% p.a. 
during the 1995 to 1997 period, after the government exercised fiscal restraint and implemented 
reforms in tax and trade policies. Removal of policy measures in the form of bans and controls 
on production, investment, capital imports and intermediate goods improved GDP growth. It 
was part of a shift from an import substituting to export promotion strategy spreading across 
Asian countries (Basu, 2004). Tax reforms of the 1990s alongside policy reforms led to the 
decline in the growth rate after 1997 as their impact on growth would only be felt in the long 
term. The public-sector deficits were rising faster than the national productivity and it got to 
almost 10% of GDP; paving way for an inflation crisis should lenders decide that the country’s 
debt-to-GDP ratio was out of control (DeLong, 2001). 
However, India’s economy was not exempt from the effects of the post-Phokran sanctions and 
the South East Asia financial crisis on world import demand and on international capital 
markets that hit a majority of developing economies. Inflation spiked in the 1988 – 99 periods 
due to a jump in prices of agricultural commodities that also caused a deceleration in the growth 
of both exports and imports. The government was cautious in its actions and managed to still 
increase its foreign currency reserves though at a slower rate than the years before (Finance 
Ministry, 2000). The economy recovered before the new millennium with inflation dropping 
to dramatically low levels of about 2.9% in January 2000 while the construction and 
manufacturing sectors contributed the most to economic growth. The government’s 
implementation of a stable tariff structure in place of the import and export controls, made the 
economy more open and competitive (Finance Ministry, 2001) 
Over the period from 1994 to early 2000, India saw the poverty levels decline alongside the 
improvement in income distribution levels that resulted in the poorest 10% in India having a 
larger share of the national income than in comparable nations (Virmani, 2005). However, the 
effects of a socialist legacy hindered the improvement of literacy and mortality over the same 
period. The country also had to deal with cases of corruption in the government and its role in 
hindering the government from fulfilling its traditional functions such as public safety and 
security, public health care, sanitation facilities and building roads among others (Basu, 2004).  
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Resumption of high economic growth rates from 2003 until 2008 when the global financial 
crisis occurred was because of fiscal consolidation in the form of increased public savings and 
spending cuts that prompted increased efficiency and improved corporate profitability and 
investments. Progressive deregulation saw a sustained increase in exports of goods and services 
(Kapur & Mohan, 2014). Services contributed about 68.6% of the overall average GDP growth 
in India in the years from 2002 and 2007. The government also actively partook in the price 
monitoring of agricultural produce, hence, making sure to balance the necessary imports 
alongside periodic restrictions of exports to stabilize demand and supply levels (Finance 
Ministry, 2008) 
In response to the global financial crisis, India’s government used both monetary and fiscal 
policy to stimulate the economy, which led to exceptionally high growth rates of about 9% in 
the 2009 to 2011 period (DeLong, 2001). The consequential effect of the fiscal stimuli (tax cuts 
and increased revenue expenditure) was high inflation and current account pressure. This 
prompted a switch from financial savings towards savings in the form of gold, causing higher 
gold imports, which exacerbated the current account deficit problem. A spike in oil and coal 
imports and drop in iron exports due to domestic policy bottlenecks saw the current account 
deficit rise to 4.7% of GDP in 2012 – 13. It then dropped to about 2.3% of GDP in 2013-14 
due to market turbulence and government policy response in the form of introducing a direct 
tax code bill and countrywide goods and services tax and containing subsidies (Kapur & 
Mohan, 2014).  
In 2017, officials from India came out lashing at credit rating officials this year for failing to 
upgrade their sovereign rating from BBB- despite economic growth and fundamentals 
improving. The country’s finance minister and chief economic officer called to question the 
methodology applied by the rating agencies and how well they understand emerging markets 
to provide them with justifiable ratings. (Goyal, 2017). Fitch countered their argument by 
stating that their levels of government deficit is still too high, relative to peers, especially in the 
states relative to the central government level (Shinate, 2017). The above sentiment is an 
indicator of the impact that CRAs have had on India which has seen its rating levels sway 
between investment grade and speculative grade (between Baa3 and Ba1 or BBB- and BB+). 
The current BBB- rating has remained unchanged since 2006 which adds up to 8 years for the 
purposes of this study and forms a basis for the frustration expressed by government officials 
who have been making an effort to have it upgraded. India’s credit rating history over the 20 
years from 1994 to 2014 has been stable with the largest drop being to 2 levels below its current 
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level to BB/Ba2 in 2001 which was a period marred by bailouts of failed government controlled 
institutions such as the 3rd largest lender, Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) and 
India's biggest equity savings scheme managed by Unit Trust of India (UTI) (Slaves of the 
state, 2001).  
2.5 China 
 
2.5.1 Government Type 
China’s government is a one-party communist state. This means that the state strives for all 
citizens to be equal in class and economic conditions. It has three branches: executive, 
legislative and judicial. The government is in place to implement the policy goals of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The executive branch of the government has two 
components: the chief of state, called a President and the head of the government called a 
Premier. The President is appointed by the National People’s Congress and he/she is 
responsible for appointing the Premier (also known as Prime Minister). Regional and local 
People’s Congresses indirectly elect the National People’s Congress (CONSTITUTION OF 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1982).  
The CCP is China’s ruling party, which means that it has effective control over the government 
as it approves all candidates for office and selects the country’s leadership. The Chinese 
government drives the economy and owns most of the country’s economic infrastructure 
(Criminal Intelligence Agency, 2017).  
2.5.2 Electoral System 
China is divided into five central and local levels of people’s congresses. They are:  
a.) The National People’s Congress (NPC)  
b.) The people’s congresses of provinces (23), autonomous regions (5) and municipalities 
(4) ruled by the Central government  
c.) The people’s congresses of cities divided into districts and autonomous prefectures,  
d.) The people’s congress of cities not divided into districts, municipal districts, counties 
and autonomous counties 
e.) The people’s congresses of townships, ethnic minority townships and towns.  
All the congresses at the various levels constitute through democratic elections for a term of 5 
years (NPC, 2007).  
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All the citizens of China that are above the age of 18 have the right to vote and to stand for 
election. An annually updated list contains everyone that is eligible to vote in an election year 
and the election committee publicizes it 20 days before the day of voting. All elections take the 
form of a secret ballot. The National Treasury provides for the expenses of the election of the 
NPC and the local peoples’ congresses. The CCP maintains a close watch on electoral 
democracy at grassroots levels (determining who can or cannot be nominated for office) and 
controls the outcomes of elections at the higher levels (Baker, 2007).  
The deputies to the first two levels of the people’s congresses in China are elected through 
indirect elections while deputies to the remaining three levels are elected by means of direct 
elections.  
Direct elections are presided over by the election committees of the same level. In these types 
of elections, voters directly cast votes to elect deputies. Voters are split into groups that form a 
constituency which can be either rural or urban and adhering to the principle that a constituency 
may only have one to three deputies. Candidates are nominated according to constituencies and 
this can be either jointly or independently by political parties, mass organizations or by more 
than 10 voters (with voters limited to nominating only the authorized number of deputies in 
their constituency). A candidate wins when he/she receives more than half of the votes and in 
the event that two candidates tie for the top votes, another election is held to get one winner. 
By elections are held when the post of a deputy falls vacant due to death, suspension of 
qualification or any other valid reason that results in a vacancy before the end of term 
(China.org.cn, 2008).  
Indirect elections are presided over by the standing committees of the people’s congress of the 
same level. In these types of elections, deputies to the peoples’ congress at the next lower level 
elect the deputies at the next higher level. Candidates are nominated according to election units 
and by political parties or mass organizations jointly or independently or by more than ten 
deputies. Candidates are introduced at deputies’ group meetings up to the day before voting 
and voting begins when more than half of the deputies are present at the occasion. A by election 
is conducted when the post of a deputy falls vacant as a result of circumstances similar to those 
of a direct election and can adopt the competitive election or equal number method 
(China.org.cn, 2008).  
The NPC has about 3000 delegates and they are empowered to elect China’s president, premier, 
vice president and the Chair of the Central Military Commission using a plurality voting system 
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with a ballot consisting of three options to choose from namely; the for, against or abstain 
(Baker, 2007). It also elects the NPC Standing Committee that approves routine and admin 
issues (Chiu, 2016).  
2.5.3 Election History over the period from 1994 to 2014 
China has held two presidential elections in the period from 1994 to 2014, see Table 4 below.  










Communist Party of 
China 
49.3% No 
2003 Hu Jintao Communist Party of 
China 
56.9% No 




2.5.4 China’s policy changes and macroeconomic outlook over the period 1994 to 2014 
 
The Chinese economy has had two eras that have vastly influenced economic growth. The first 
era (pre-1990) saw growth driven by allocative efficiency and productive efficiency while 
capital deepening, investment-led industrialisation drove post 1990s growth (Lardy, 2015). The 
period right before the transition of eras i.e. 1980 – 1990 saw a prolonged stagnation termed as 
the “lost decades of development” as evidenced by the worst levels of income distribution. 
China underwent a capitalist transformation, with part of the rapid growth they experienced 
being due to “super-exploitation” of Chinese labour, and thus a reform was necessary. The 
level of industrialization in China used to be significantly lower and growth in the first era was 
achieved through labour transfer from rural-agricultural jobs to industrial jobs. Mass 
consumption (with expanded demand for products spiking both domestically and 
internationally) also vastly drove growth in the first era. Consumption fostered the growth of 
the industries of mass-production, especially that of new consumer durables.  
The second era saw a switch from labour-intensive growth towards capital deepening growth 
(financed by large domestic savings and foreign investment). An improvement in productive 
efficiency and specifically in production of investment goods played a role in the transition. 
The East Asian financial crisis hit in the 1997 – 1998 period but it did not affect the Chinese 
market, which had just come from a phase of privatisation of state owned entities (transforming 
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large SOEs into modern corporations) from 1995-97. However, the consequent result of the 
above-mentioned privatisation was felt in the period 1998 to 2002 when unemployment rose 
by close to 100 basis points from 3.1% (1998) to 4% (2002) while consumption and investment 
dropped. China found itself in a state of deflation. The government had to implement policies 
that facilitated fiscal stimuli, welfare-state measures and revitalization of SOEs (Lo & Zhang, 
2011).  
GDP growth and inflation were on the rise from 2002 all through to 2004 but at unsustainable 
levels of 9% of GDP and inflation averaging about 3.5%. High investment growth spurred by 
select sectors growing too fast, drove GDP growth alongside structural reforms implemented 
in the banking sector, SOEs and labour market. Furthermore, the government turned to 
monetary policy tools such as increasing benchmark interest rates and reserve requirements to 
lower growth to sustainable levels of about 8.5% in 2005 but this did not help as GDP growth 
again rose to about 14.2% in 2007 (Barnett, 2005).  
However, similar to other players in the global economy, China was hit by the global economic 
crisis of 2008 that led to a decline in exports, imports and FDI. GDP growth dropped from 
14.7% to 9.6% and a lot of workers lost their jobs. The government responded with a $586bn 
stimulus package and loosening monetary policies that increased bank lending, boosted 
domestic investment and consumption. The Chinese economy recovered to see it take the title 
of the World’s largest manufacturer by 2013 (Morrison, 2015). Favourable policy environment 
that supported funding investments in science and technology, employee education and 
infrastructure development facilitated China’s competitiveness in the global economy. 
Real GDP growth had been on a decline from 10.4% in 2010, to 7.8% in 2012 and eventually 
to 7.3% in 2014. China’s large population and low wage rates that drove the economy before 
were affected by changes due to the implementation of economic reforms. Chinese wages 
increased by 309% from 2005 to 2014, a measure the government supports as it sought to boost 
the nation’s innovation and productivity levels (Barnett, 2005). Officials still view China as a 
“socialist-market economy” with SOEs accounting for over 50% of GDP and a weak banking 
sector controlled by the central bank that works in favour of SOEs (Wooldridge, 2012). 
Officials want the government to use policy reform to transform it to a free market economy.  
China is the one country in BRICS that has enjoyed a consistent high credit rating history over 
the period from 1994 to 2014. The lowest rating China received in this period was by S&P in 
1999 and the reason for the downgrade was the negative effect that the East Asia crisis of 1997 
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and 1998 had on GDP growth, foreign trade and foreign investment in China. China recovered 
from that and over time got its rating levels up again with all three CRAs showing consistency 
and uniformity with how they arrive at China’s sovereign rating (Keidel, 2007).  
2.6 South Africa  
 
2.6.1 Government Type 
SA is a constitutional democracy that has a three-tier system of government and an independent 
judiciary. The National, Provincial and Local levels of government all have legislative and 
executive authority in their own spheres. The legislative authority at the national level is 
Parliament which is made up of the National Assembly (400 seats) and the National Council 
of Provinces (90 seats) while the provincial legislature is the authority at the provincial level. 
The National Assembly is constituted in accordance with the votes cast in the General elections 
while the National Council of Provinces is comprised of delegates nominated by each 
provincial legislature. The executive authority at the national level is the Cabinet, which 
comprises of the President, Deputy President and Ministers while at the provincial level it is 
the Provincial Executive Councils made up of the Premier and members of the executive 
council (South African Government, 2017).  
2.6.2 Electoral System 
South Africa’s ‘proportional representation’ system was selected for its inclusiveness, 
simplicity and tendency to encourage a coalition government. In national elections, SA citizens 
cast a vote for a single party of their choice; the country is split into 10 large multi-member 
district regions, which are the nine provinces and one national district for the country as a 
whole. A proportional representation system ensures that the allocation of seats in parliament 
is in direct proportion to the number of votes a party received (Lodge, 2003).  
The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) facilitates general elections that take place every 
5 years. It ensures that they are free and fair. In these elections, voters elect the national and 
provincial legislatures simultaneously on two separate ballots by selecting the political party 
of their choice based on the list of parties contesting on either level (national or provincial). It 
is up to the parties to decide whom they want in their legislatures and they present this in the 
form of (ranked) lists to the IEC, which then publicises this information countrywide.  
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Upon completion of elections and tallying of votes, the seats allocated to each party are filled 
as per the ranked lists. The National Assembly’s constitution is based on the National ballot 
and is done in two tiers: half are regional seats and the others are national and it is based on the 
lists submitted. A Droop Quota method is used to determine the number of seats a given number 
of votes is worth. This method involves dividing the number of votes by the total number of 
seats for each region (for region seats) and for the nation (for national seats). Seats are then 
allocated proportionally depending on how many times the party meets the full quota calculated 
by “dividing each party’s share of the vote, regionally and then nationally, by the quotas 
determined at those levels.” (Alvarez-Rivera, 2015). If the process ends with unallocated seats 
then, these seats are allocated to the parties that had the largest remainders based on the 
calculation above.  
South Africa has just over 26 million registered voters. One needs to be an SA citizen and 
should be 18 years and older to be eligible to vote. All registered voters are recorded in a voter’s 
roll that is used for verification purposes on the day of elections to make sure voters only vote 
once.  
2.6.3 Election History over the period from 1994 to 2014 
Elections in South Africa are held after every 5 years. South Africa had its first non-racial 
democratic election in 1994 and Nelson Mandela was unanimously elected as the first 
democratic president with Thabo Mbeki and F.W. De Klerk as his deputies. Nelson Mandela 
and Thabo Mbeki were both part of the African National Congress (ANC), which won the 
national elections with a 54% majority. Nelson Mandela resigned as president of the ANC in 
1997 and Thabo Mbeki, his deputy, succeeded him. When the country held elections in 1999, 
the ANC had an even stronger victory, scooping 266 seats in parliament, which equated to 
65.7% majority. Thabo Mbeki was sworn in as the country’s second post-apartheid president 
and he appointed Jacob Zuma, chairperson of the ANC as his deputy. 
In the elections of 2004, the ANC had another resounding victory with 67.7% majority over 
their opponents and Thabo Mbeki became president for a second term. In June 2005, President 
Mbeki dismissed his deputy, Jacob Zuma due to his implication in a corruption scandal. He 
appointed Phumzile Mlambo – Ngcuka as Zuma’s replacement. In a turn of events in 2007, 
ANC delegates elected Jacob Zuma to be the party’s leader over acting president, Thabo 
Mbeki. This led to Thabo Mbeki handing in his resignation letter in parliament in 2008, 9 
months before his second term of office expired. Parliament then elected Kgalema Motlanthe, 
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a former trade unionist, freedom fighter and deputy leader of the ruling ANC, as interim 
president when Mbeki left office.  
ANC had another victory in the 2009 elections with a 65.9% majority. Jacob Zuma, the party 
leader was elected as the president of the republic. The fifth democratic elections were held in 
2014 and the ANC won again with a 62.15% majority, paving way for Jacob Zuma to pursue 
a second term in office (SA History Online, 2016).  
Table 5 below presents the summary of the elections history in a democratic South Africa from 
1994 to present. 












1999 Thabo Mbeki African National 
Congress 
56.8% No 
2004 Thabo Mbeki African National 
Congress 
57.3% Yes 
2009 Jacob Zuma African National 
Congress 
49.2% No 




2.6.4 South Africa’s policy changes and macroeconomic outlook over the period 1994 to 
2014 
 
South Africa has seen a lot of development in its economy since the apartheid era ended and 
the international sanctions in place were abolished. The government had the mammoth task of 
rebuilding the nation to ensure that all its citizens had access to equal social and economic 
benefits by addressing the injustices of the colonial era. In the lead up to elections in 1994, the 
ANC promised to implement the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and it 
lived up to that promise after the 1994 election victory. The RDP was an integrated socio-
economic policy framework based on the six principles of: an integrated and sustainable 
programme, a people-driven process, peace and security for all, nation building, link 
reconstruction and development and democratisation of South Africa. The principles of the 
programme were targeted at addressing and redressing the inherited gross inequalities of 
apartheid (Heymans, 1995).  
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Up until 1994, the South African economy was being driven mainly by minerals (resources) 
(11% of GDP) with manufacturing, transport and telecommunication sectors beginning to pick 
up and show promise thereafter. After noticeable success of the RDP policy, the South African 
government introduced the Growth, Employment And Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in 
1996. GEAR was designed to stimulate faster economic growth, which required the provision 
of resources to meet social investment needs (SA History Online, 2014). It was successful in 
achieving the aforementioned goals because the government met its fiscal targets for the fiscal 
deficit, inflation and government consumption by the end of 2000. Tightening monetary policy 
and restructuring all government levels helped maintain government consumption at a 
reasonable figure (Edwards & Lawrence, 2008).  
However, despite its success, GEAR did not address the issues of poverty and increasing 
unemployment in South Africa. As a result, the government introduced the Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) in 2005 as a replacement for GEAR. 
ASGISA aimed to build on the goals of GEAR and RDP as well as to reduce poverty by 2010 
and cutting unemployment by half from 28% in 2004 to 14% in 2014 (Marais, 2001). President 
Thabo Mbeki, who proposed and implemented this initiative, did not get to see it have 
meaningful impact after he lost ANC presidency in 2008 and Zuma got elected president in 
2009. President Zuma scrapped ASGISA and replaced it with the New Growth Plan (NGP), 
which he announced in 2010 at the State of the Nation Address (SONA). The NGP was 
complemented by the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030, which the SA government 
launched in 2013 as a long-term plan to achieve socio-economic development (SA History 
Online, 2014). It is worth noting how changes in leadership leads to the scrapping and 
replacement of development plans which in turns hit the lower-class members of society as 
they are the major beneficiaries of the changes effected by those plans.  
South Africa’s average annualised growth rate in real GDP over the period 1994 to 2014 stood 
at about 3.5% with the highest levels observed in the period 2005 to 2007 and the lowest during 
and after the global financial crisis (2008 – 2009). The share of mining in GDP dropped from 
11% (1994) to about 5% of GDP (2014) while the financial and business services sector share 
increased from 17% to about 24% in the same period (Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbur, & Ncube, 2013). 
South Africa’s strong and reputable financial system led to increased FDI but concern is on the 
manufacturing sector that has not seen a significant increase in its share of GDP over 20 years 
and this is a possible explanation for why the unemployment levels in South Africa are still up 
(Edwards & Lawrence, 2008).  
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Unlike Russia, South Africa managed to diversify its drivers of GDP growth from the primary 
source, mining. The success could be attributed to the policy approach the SA government 
took. The government implements fiscal policy on a 3-year horizon and is usually 
countercyclical to a weakening economic growth environment. One fiscal measure that has 
been viewed negatively by economic players is the rising fiscal deficit which the government 
has been relying on to spur economic growth. This is viewed as a sign that the government is 
lacking efficiency in utilising current government revenue, 89% of which is attributed to tax 
revenue collected via personal, corporate and value added tax (Aziakpono & Wilson, 2015).   
Monetary policy has also been subject to developments. From 1986 through to 1998, the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) used a pre-announced M3 monetary target. After 1998, the 
SARB shifted to using daily tenders of liquidity through repurchase transactions. It took to 
announcing monetary growth guidelines and target ranges every three years. In February 2000, 
it adopted a new framework based on inflation targeting which was modified in 2009 to 
headline-inflation targeting (Aziakpono & Wilson, 2015). The government’s influence on 
monetary policy is through setting and adjusting inflation targets but the SARB has operational 
independence in monetary policy. After 1979, South Africa switched to a flexible exchange 
rate system from a fixed regime with the Rand pegged to the Dollar or Pound. The dual 
currency ended in 1995 and exchange rate management by the SARB halted after inflation 
targeting was put in place in 2000 (Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbur, & Ncube, 2013).  
South Africa’s credit rating history is one that has shown a cyclical movement over the 
duration from 1994 to 2014. Across all the 3 CRAs it began at BB level (below investment 
grade) from 1994 to 2000, treaded on the BBB- level (investment grade) between 2001 and 
2003, went above that from 2004 through to 2012 maintaining a high of BBB+ between 2006 
and 2012 before beginning a way down to BBB- by mid-2014. A unique characteristic of the 
SA economy is the resilience it showed during the 2008 global financial crisis – the credit 
rating levels were unchanged and while GDP growth was hampered, the government 
managed to still to reduce its gross loan debt as a percentage of GDP (Stanlib, 2015). The 
main drivers for the series of downgrades that SA experienced from 2012 to 2014 were 
industrial action across a variety of sectors (mining and public works), rising unemployment 
levels and declining growth forecasts due to the financial crisis in Europe which is SA’s 




Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter lays out a chronological order of how the Political Business Cycle (PBC) theory 
and literature has evolved, from inception right through to its current state. It takes from the 
works of a range of academics who have built in various assumptions to the traditional model 
in order to make the theory more relevant and testable. The framework acknowledges that the 
focus was on developed economies in earlier works on PBC theory and thus modifications to 
the original theory needed to be applicable to both developed and developing democracies. As 
a result, this chapter presents the traditional PBC theory as the main theory that was initially 
used to explain political business cycles and thereafter it presents the various other theories that 
are as a result of the modifications that led to the split of the traditional PBC theory into 
opportunistic PBC and partisan PBC theories. To achieve this objective, the rest of the chapter 
is organised as follows; section 3.2 provides an overview of the traditional PBC theory. 
Thereafter the sections 3.3 and 3.4 present the Opportunistic PBC and Partisan PBC theories 
respectively with each dissected further and discussed from both a traditional and rational 
perspectives respectively. 
3.2 Traditional PBC Theory 
 
Literature on PBCs dates back to the ground-breaking papers by Nordhaus (1975), Lindbeck 
(1976) and Tufte (1978) who conducted research exclusively on industrialized democracies. 
They developed the traditional PBC theory, which characterizes politicians as identical and 
opportunistic individuals, whose main and perhaps only preference is to stay in power for as 
long as they possibly can (Nordhaus, 1975). Their theory proceeded to characterise voters as 
myopic, naïve people that are highly prone to voting for incumbents based on how effective 
they were in delivering social services and keeping unemployment low in the lead up to 
elections (Chiripanhura & Nino-Zarazua, 2015).  
 
The theory first developed by Nordhaus (1975) took its framework from the Phillips Curve, 
where a downward sloping curve shows a trade-off between unemployment and output versus 
the rate of inflation. The trade-off is greater in the short-run than in the long run i.e. a change 
in unemployment will led to less inflation in the short run than it would in the long run. Using 
similar reasoning, Nordhaus (1975) also noted that incumbents’ terms in office are 
characterised by predictable policy patterns, beginning with conservative austerity in early 
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years and ending with large spending in the lead up to elections. Nordhaus (1975) and McRae 
(1977) found that economic policy choices were motivated by support from voters who had 
largely homogenous preferences (low unemployment and low inflation) and high discount rates 
i.e. had short memories, lacked foresight and looked only at the incumbents’ most recent 
performance.   
 
Econometric tests for PBC in Inflation and/or unemployment yielded mixed results. Allen et 
al. (1986), McGavin (1987), Haynes & Stone (1988, 1989, and 1990), Keil (1988) and Findlay 
(1990) found evidence in favour of Nordhaus’ Theory while McCallum (1978), Golden & 
Poterba (1980), Beck (1982), Alesina (1988, 1989) and Davidson et al. (1990) did not agree 
with Nordhaus’ findings and the conclusions that were drawn from his study  
 
Contrary to Nordhaus (1975), Tufte (1978) took a different approach and studied variables that 
the government has direct control of instead of inflation and unemployment. He found that the 
USA government tried to impress the public before elections by raising (social welfare) 
transfers or by lowering taxes. This form of tampering with fiscal balances was considered the 
most robust empirical characteristic of the electoral cycle.  
 
Academics who looked at the early PBC works raised some concerns and this led to the 
traditional PBC theory being split into the Opportunistic PBC and Partisan PBC theories. Each 
of these theories is discussed separately below in light of how it fits to the traditional theory 
and how it differs once the element of rationality is taken into account. 
 
3.3 Opportunistic PBC Theory  
The opportunistic PBC theory can be best understood by discussing it in terms of the traditional 
and rational perspectives. The subsequent sub sections provide a discussion on the 
opportunistic PBC theory in light of these two categories mentioned above. The first subsection 
provides a descriptive view in light of the traditional view as well as discussing empirical 
evidence gathered in past studies based on this perspective. The second subsection explains the 
opportunistic PBC theory in light of the rational perspective as well as discussing evidence 
gathered in past studies based on this view. The discussion of these sub theories is presented 
below as follows: 
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3.3.1 Traditional Opportunistic PBC Theory 
 
The traditional opportunistic PBC Theory is a progression from the original theory built by 
Nordhaus (1975). It combines the adaptive expectations of voters with politicians who 
manipulate the country’s economic business cycle so that they have higher chances of re-
election. This manipulation is done through the use of expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies before elections.  
 Empirically, Cuikerman and Meltzer (1986) conducted a study on how much influence 
incumbents had on central banks and the role that politicians’ credibility and ambiguousness 
played in the occurrence of PBCs. They found that despite central banks being revered as 
independent bodies, they were subject to influence from the government and this affected the 
decisions that they made. The opportunism arose from the fact that the public was completely 
unaware and uninformed about the political and economic factors that steered the government 
to exerting influence on the banks. The manner in which this influence was exerted was very 
unpredictable and only applied when it best suited the political leaders.  
Cuikerman and Meltzer (1986) also found a strong link between the credibility of policymakers 
and the informational disadvantage that the public faced. Policymakers that instituted a large 
informational gap between them and their constituents lacked credibility and their actions had 
a detrimental effect on the sovereigns’ economies (Cuikerman and Meltzer, 1986). A means of 
measuring the credibility of policymakers was assessed by observing the level of ambiguity in 
their policymaking. Unstable objectives of policy makers were evidenced by an imperfect 
control of money growth that led to an increase in ambiguity and left the public in the dark. 
The Cuikerman and Meltzer (1986) study also found that policy makers had a tendency to steer 
clear from efficient monetary control procedures as a given level of ambiguity allowed them 
the leeway to create monetary surprises that were timely and advantageous to them i.e. in the 
lead up to elections. The resultant effect of high levels of ambiguity by policy makers was high 
levels of noise in monetary control and large variances in the inflation levels of the sovereigns. 
This, to other economic players and the international investment community, are signs of 
political instability (Cuikerman and Meltzer, 1986). Inflation levels would decrease 
considerably before elections and spike right after due to the contractionary effects of unstable 
policies implemented in the short run (Cuikerman and Meltzer, 1986).  
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Rogoff and Sibert (1988) conducted a study in an effort to find electoral cycles based on 
national elections in the United States (USA) and Germany. They found positive evidence for 
cycles in taxes, government spending and monetary growth in the aforementioned countries. 
Their study focused on the competency levels of the two governments. Competent 
governments, are governments that were able to deliver a higher level of public goods for a 
given level of tax revenue. In their study, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) observed that information 
on the governments’ levels of competency was visible more quickly to the government whereas 
the public observed it with a lag. They also observed that the temporary information 
asymmetries between the government and the public were the main drivers of the electoral 
cycles (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988). They observed that information asymmetries existed mostly 
in current than in past information and that it was information relating to government 
performance indicators that the public had little or no access to (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988). They 
also found that incumbents fared the worst when their private information was either extremely 
favourable or unfavourable as the public was in a position to make a better decision based on 
what they got access to (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988). As a result, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) 
concluded by adding that opposition parties were disadvantaged in that they had no means of 
signalling their policy competence to the public and this left the public with only the incumbent 
signals to rely on.  
Two years later, Rogoff (1990) conducted another study focusing on the composition effect of 
electoral cycles in output and inflation as influenced by fiscal policy. He termed these types of 
cycles the “Political Budget Cycles” (Rogoff, 1990). His findings were very much consistent 
with those of the Rogoff and Sibert (1988) study in that he found that governments tended to 
direct funds (consumption expenditure) to projects with high immediate visibility (a sign of 
their competence) as elections drew closer in order to sway the public (Rogoff, 1990). 
Therefore, in an attempt to balance out the current account, Rogoff (1990) found that 
government investment had to be lowered because the full influence of such action took long 
to be apparent. 
Persson and Tabellini (1990), on the other hand, found that voters re-elected incumbent 
policymakers based on their competency and voted them out if they were lacking. Their 
findings stressed that the competency of the government is not directly observable but that it 
has a simultaneous effect on the level of employment which is observable (Persson & Tabellini, 
1990). They also observed that the policymaker would inflate the economy and raise 
employment before elections in a bid to mimic a high level of competence (Persson and 
48 
 
Tabellini, 1990). However, they also observed that the consequences of the pre-election 
inflationary action only became recognizable after the elections (Persson and Tabellini, 1990).  
An examination of the above findings shows that they all follow the adverse selection model 
that focuses on the informational advantage that incumbents and the government have over 
voters concerning their true competence (Dubois, 2016). In a bid to develop a framework in 
which political and economic cycles intersect, Ales et al, (2014) found that both cycles are 
driven by the interactions of “non-benevolent policymakers who do not commit to policies and 
that have private information about the tightness of government budgets and rents” (Ales et al, 
2014, p.224). However, the limitation in the studies above is that they do not analyse or try to 
understand voter behaviour or the link between voter behaviour and the incumbents’ decisions. 
The theory that follows below delves into that. 
3.3.2 Rational Opportunistic PBC Theory 
Apart from the traditional opportunistic PBC theory, some studies replaced the assumptions of 
the traditional opportunistic PBC theory by assuming that voters are rational, and hence, they 
form rational expectations and that they model their voting behaviour around their expectations 
(that is, they also vote in a rational manner). This line of thought led to another dimension of 
the opportunistic PBC theory, which was then coined the rational opportunistic PBC theory.  
This theory builds by opposes the voter irrationality assumption and replaces it with the 
assumptions that voters tend to have rational expectations and that their voting is rationally 
retrospective.  It too, relies on the asymmetric information between voters and policy makers 
who manipulate the economy to appear more competent prior to elections (Block, 2002).  
Lohmann (1998) was the first to conduct a study that incorporated these assumptions and based 
them on a model of political cycles in inflation and output growth. Lohmann (1998) found 
voters to be poorly informed about the quality or competence of political candidates and when 
they tried to scrutinise the incumbent’s economic performance (to know their competency 
levels), it resulted in policy and selection effects with ambiguous consequences for welfare. As 
a result, Lohmann (1998) interpreted the quality of a candidate/incumbent to being the fit 
between their known policy positions and the unknown characteristics of the political and 
economic environment. 
Based on a study conducted on Argentina and Brazil, Stein and Streb (1998) sought to identify 
a link between the timing of price stabilization and elections. They found that the Primavera 
Plan by the Argentinian government and the Cruzedo Plan by the Brazilian government were 
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marked by lowering inflation (a signal of competency) in the short run through foreign debt 
accumulation (Stein and Streb, 1998). This method of increasing their chances of re-election 
result in “stop-go cycles in inflation”, similar to political cycles. The governments’ use of 
foreign debt accumulation to stabilize prices was facilitated by using exchange rates as a 
nominal anchor for prices. This strategy leads to a boom in the short run that later gives way to 
a recession. It also means that the government shifts the inflation tax burden to the future, when 
all the debt has to be repaid. As a result, Stein and Streb (1998) opined that voters only observe 
the effect of foreign debt with a lag after the elections have taken place and the incumbent has 
been re-elected. Stein and Streb (1998) concluded their study with a recommendation for 
institutional reform that would increase government transparency on accounts such as budget 
deficits, reserves, monetary aggregates, balance of payments accounts and debt – in order to 
make the information available to the public.   
Roemer (2000) had a similar view on candidate competency when he found that candidates 
ended up standing for the objective accuracy of their ideologies and overlooked the workings 
of the economy. He opined that since voters have no information to evaluate the quality of the 
challenger, they are forced to choose by comparing their estimate of the incumbent’s quality to 
the expected quality of a random challenger from a pool of challengers (Roemer, 2000). The 
result of this is that the incumbent will be re-elected if economic outcomes are favourable and 
the challenger wins if they are not. Lohmann (1998) study also deduced that competent 
incumbents had a stronger incentive to avoid losing elections and were more likely to inflate 
the monetary supply for electoral purposes, hence, causing negative welfare consequences.  
The above findings all follow the moral hazard problem faced by voters that comes about when 
incumbents modulate their efforts to appear than they really are through policy instruments that 
are unobservable to the public (Dubois, 2016). Baleiras (1997) conducted a micro level study 
focusing on the drivers of asymmetry on key policy outcomes – preferences polarisation. In 
trying to understand PBC determinants from the politician’s point of view, he found that the 
incumbent’s own post-electoral welfare concern is a cause of PBC. In other words, politicians 
chose policies that will maximise their own welfare after elections especially as most of them 
have no alternative career path to follow once they have relinquished their power. Baleiras & 
Costa (2004) expanded on the finding above through a study on Portuguese municipal electoral 
data from 1986 to 1993. Motivation for Portugal as the country of study was due to the high 
fiscal decentralisation it had been experiencing in the past two decades and uncertainty about 
political decision making that was higher on a local government level. Analysis of the data 
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revealed that public expenditures shot up in the lead up to local government elections and that 
was because incumbents wanted to satisfy their own utility and maximise their re-election 
chances (Baleiras & Costa, 2004). 
Several studies have looked at how voters either rewarded or penalised incumbents for 
opportunistic behaviour. Rewarding of opportunistic behaviour was observed in Russia’s 
regional elections by (Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya, 2004), Portuguese municipal elections by 
(Aidt, Veiga, & Veiga, 2011), Brazil’s local government elections by (Sakurai & Menezes-
Filho, 2008) and Litschig & Morrison (2012), Argentina’s provincial elections by Jones et al 
(2012) and in 68 general elections by Mourao & Veiga (2010). Penalization of said behaviour 
was observed in elections in the USA by Peltzman (1992), Latin American and Caribbean 
countries by Kraemer (1997), Argentina by Meloni (2001), Israel by Brender (2003) and a mix 
of countries by Brender and Drazen (2008).    
Apart from empirical evidence provided by some studies with the focus on the opportunistic 
PBC theory and its sub theories, other studies provided empirical evidence on the political 
business cycles using the Partisan PBC theories and its sub categories. The review of the 
Partisan PBC theory and its sub categories is discussed in the next section.  
3.4 Partisan PBC Theory 
Similar to the opportunistic PBC theory, the Partisan PBC theory is also split into the traditional 
and rational PBC theory perspectives. A discussion based on each split is conducted separately 
in the subsequent sub sections as follows: 
3.4.1 Traditional Partisan PBC Theory 
Hibbs (1977) developed the Traditional Partisan theory in 1977 by conducting a study that 
looked at aggregated data on unemployment and inflation outcomes from 12 West European 
and North American nations. His research built on the Nordhaus (1975) model and the trade-
off between unemployment and inflation but insisted that politicians were not only entirely 
opportunistic but that they were also reliant on the partisan preferences of their electorate 
(Hibbs, 1977). He maintained the notion that voting behaviour was still retrospective and voters 
were naïve and myopic.  Hibbs (1977) found that lower income and occupational status groups 
favoured a relatively low unemployment and high inflation macroeconomic landscape while 
those of upper income and occupational status groups were drawn to a high unemployment and 
low inflation configuration.   
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With countries’ data to work with, Hibbs (1977) identified that a low unemployment-high 
inflation and output growth configuration was prevalent in nations regularly governed by 
Leftist leaders and that a high unemployment-low inflation pattern prevailed in political 
systems dominated by centre and rightist parties. The variances observed in inflation and 
unemployment levels over time were found to be a function of the party in power (Hibbs, 
1977). To substantiate the aforementioned finding, Hibbs (1977) conducted further time series 
analysis on unemployment data from the US and Great Britain and found that unemployment 
rate had been driven downwards by Democratic and Labour administrations and upwards by 
Republican and Conservative governments. In light of this finding, Hibbs (1977) concluded 
that governments tend to pursue macroeconomic policies that are in accordance with the 
economic interests and subjective preferences of their class-defined core political 
constituencies. This model affirms that the level of inflation and unemployment in any given 
country will be a function of the preference of the party in power. Voters’ expectations are still 
adaptive and as a result, incumbents can put policies in place that sway them in their favour. 
Apart from the traditional partisan PBC theory, other studies focus on the rational partisan PBC 
theory. The next sub section discusses how actions of incumbents differ when voters with 
differing ideologies are assumed to have rational expectations of their incumbents’ policy 
choices.  
3.4.2 Rational Partisan PBC Theory 
Alesina (1987) rationalised the Hibbs (1997) model by considering voters to have rational 
expectations and rational voting behaviour. He also added that voters are perfectly informed 
given their interaction with only two parties (Alesina, 1987). Alesina (1987)’s model was based 
on the interaction of two different parties, with different objectives and policy objectives 
pertaining to inflation and unemployment. Furthermore, the Alesina (1987) model assumes that 
incumbents have different incentives to deviate from their commitments, which also leads to 
economic cycles connected to the political affiliation. The model also incorporated wage setters 
who are private agents that are rational and forward looking. The model assumes that wage 
setters have to act first by setting the nominal wage and policy makers are assumed to respond 
thereafter. The Policy makers are argued to use this as an opening to implement and maintain 
low inflation policies in the earlier years of their office terms and then generate unexpected 
inflation that would reduce unemployment when they are closer to elections (Alesina, 1987).  
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Alesina (1987) studied the USA system, using the post-world war II data. He wanted to find 
which assumption was more relevant between parties caring about the effects of their policies 
and parties having different objectives and incentives. This “partisan view of macroeconomic 
policy suggesting that parties act differently when in office was receiving increasing support 
for the US and other industrialised economies” (Alesina, 1987, p. 652). In his findings, Alesina 
(1987) asserted that the cycles observed were just economic cycles that were not similar to 
political business cycles. He observed that when a party was elected into office, it had two 
choices: that is, to enforce a policy plan that would maximise the short run benefits for its 
constituency or to follow a cooperative policy path that makes both constituencies better off in 
the end (Alesina, 1987). For the latter to happen, Alesina (1987) opined that a bargaining 
process needed to take place first between the two parties involved, which would then lead to 
a potential adoption of a cooperative common policy rule that makes both constituencies better 
off in the end. Repeated interaction between the two parties and with the public was argued to 
help to improve the uniformity and reduce the costly and sizeable fluctuations in inflation and 
output that would occur due to drastic policy switches when there is a change in administration 
(Alesina, 1987).  
As a follow up on the Alesina (1987) study, Alesina and Roubini (1992) conducted a study 
with particular focus on how GNP growth, unemployment and inflation were affected by the 
timing of elections and change of governments in 18 OECD economies for a duration of three 
decades. They tested the implications of both the opportunistic and partisan models of PBC 
and their data set yielded results that leaned towards the latter model (Alesina and Roubini, 
1992). One of their key findings was that their data rejected the hypothesis formulated by 
Nordhaus (1975). However, they did observe that inflation tended to spike immediately after 
elections, with the likely cause for this being pre-electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies (Alesina and Roubini, 1992). They also found temporary partisan differences in output 
and unemployment and long run partisan differences in the level of inflation as suggested by 
Alesina’s (1987) “rational partisan theory” (Alesina and Roubini, 1992). 
Bove et al. (2016) studied two types of spending that they believed were causes of PBCs in a 
country where the electorate had differing partisan preferences. Their findings showed that 
when the left-wing was in power, the government was more concerned with state intervention, 
income redistribution and expansionary fiscal policies and as such they increased social 
“butter” expenditure. This fostered an environment conducive for economic voting - voting 
influenced by redistributive policies (unemployment and old age benefits) relative to non-
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economic voting influenced by higher defence spending (to quell conflict or improve national 
security. Their study showed that right-wing administrations favoured military “guns” 
expenditure and the trade-off between the two expenditures was larger when countries are 
experiencing a conflict (Bove, Efthyvoulou, & Navas, 2016).  
After expounding on the variations of PBC theory, the remainder of this chapter examines the 
BRICS members individually with the aim of identifying and substantiating the relevant PBC 
theory that applies to each of them. The examination of the types of PBC theories that applies 
to individual members of the BRICS nations is discussed in the subsequent section. 
3.5 PBC theories that apply to the BRICS 
Brazil has a highly segmented political party system, which should make their elections 
competitive. However, there are four main parties and two of them have produced all the 
Presidents over the period from 1994 to 2014. The dominant parties are the Brazilian Social 
Democracy Party (PSDB) and The Workers' Party (PT). Both these parties are viewed as being 
centre-left as are other strong political parties in Brazil (Hobold, 2015). There are no strong 
right-wing parties and as such, partisan effects would not affect Brazil. The most relevant PBC 
theory for Brazil would be the Rational Opportunistic theory.  
Russia has a multiparty political system but because parties forge alliances to rally behind the 
two strongest parties, the system exhibits characteristics of bipolarity. The ruling political party 
is United Russia and it describes itself as being centrist and conservative. It has won four of 
the five elections that Russia held between 1994 and 2014 (BBC, 2012). The main opposition 
party is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), which is the largest and most 
popular left-wing party in Russia (Kagarlitsky, 1998). The most relevant PBC theory for Russia 
would be the Rational Partisan theory because of the clear two-party contention for presidency 
with both having close but differing ideologies e.g. centrist versus leftist.  
India has a multiparty political system with six recognized national parties, namely the 
Congress, the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Communist Party of India (CPI), the CPI (M), the 
Bahujan Samaj Party and the Nationalist Congress Party. On top of these, it has 52 state parties 
and 1112 registered unrecognized parties (Balaji, 2010). Members of the Vidhan, Lok and 
Rajya Sabhas as discussed in Chapter 2 elect the President. The most relevant PBC theory for 
India would be the Rational Opportunistic theory because the electoral system allows multiple 
parties to determine who gets in to government and this competition breeds room for 
manipulative policies and actions for the sake of better re-election chances.  
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China, on the other hand, has a multiparty political system with nine recognized political 
parties. The main party is the Communist Party of China (CPC) and it has produced the 
president from 1994 to 2014. The other eight parties are democratic but not opposition parties 
and they support the leadership of the CPC (About China, 2004). The case of China is very 
peculiar when it comes to determining the most relevant PBC theory because it has a single-
party political system.  It is likely that the Rational Opportunistic theory fits best because the 
current party is unchallenged and its monopoly of the government paves way for opportunism 
and policies that favour those that support the government and fund it during elections which 
are not intensely contested either way.  
South Africa has a multiparty political system that has seen the number of opposition parties 
increasing since independence in 1994. The ruling party is the African National Congress 
(ANC) that has produced the presidents from 1994 to 2014. Opposition parties have gradually 
been building supporter numbers with the top two being the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). There is no clear defined left or right-wing party in South 
Africa, as the ideologies that define either of them are not engrained in the political system. 
The most relevant PBC theory for South Africa would also be the Rational Opportunistic theory 
because the ruling party is coming under pressure from a growing opposition and they are going 
to have to perform in order to prove to voters that they are still the top party of choice. 
Economic conditions and the political climate are not favourable and this is likely to push the 
incumbents to manipulating policy and accounts to retain supporters.  
It’s vital to note that CRAs were active in the 5-member countries that this study is looking at 
from 1994 to 2014. They released ratings at no predetermined times of the year, taking into 
consideration a wide array of factors, some of which are political. Given that CRAs posted 
ratings both before and after election periods, in the former case, they are likely to have eroded 
some of the informational advantage that policy makers possess over their voters. A voter base 
that paid attention to rating actions that their sovereign received would be in a position to make 
an informed decision come elections but in BRICS, the rate of literacy amongst voters is 
substantially low and thus voters couldn’t make use of the information conveyed in the ratings. 
The next chapter shall look at the literature view, categorizing it based on studies that 
investigated for PBC in individual countries and in a group of countries. The view of literature 
highlights the nature of the economies that were covered in both cases (individual and group 
cases) based on whether they were developed and/or developing. 
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Chapter 4 - Literature Review 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The literature on political business cycles has been growing over the last forty years since the 
original theory was developed and publicized. As observed in chapter 3, further extensions 
arose from the initial theory and academics have been doing a lot of work using data from 
various economies to validate the assumptions affiliated with the theories. 
The literature review below is split into two – academic work on developed economies and 
those based on developing economies. The reason for using that as the divide is because early 
research was conducted using data from developed economies because it was readily 
available and well documented unlike that of developing economies which was inconsistent 
and mostly unavailable. However, as democratization took root in developing economies, 
they began to play a bigger role in the global economy. Institutions such as the WB and the 
IMF began to track and keep records of their political and macroeconomic data and this 
paved way for PBC research to be conducted on them.   
The split above is further categorized into literature from single industrialized and single 
developing economies, groups of purely industrialized or developing economies and lastly, 
evidence from a mix of both industrialized and developing economies. The reason for this 
further split is so that we can see what causes PBCs in individual countries and then compare 
that to cases where evidence of PBCs is tested for a group of countries with similar economic 
statuses or that are in a particular region affiliated with a set type of currency or commodity.  
The final part of the literature review below looks at academic works that have investigated 
the link between PBCs and credit ratings.  
 
4.2 Evidence from single industrialized developed economies  
 
McCallum (1978) ran a least-squares regression on quarterly USA data for the period 1948 
through to 1974 to test the hypothesis developed by Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace (1975) 
who used works of Robert Lucas (1976) to come up with the Lucas-Sargent Proposition (LSP). 
The LSP suggests that incumbent governments are not capable of creating economic booms in 
the lead up to elections because output and unemployment are likely to remain unaffected due 
to private consumers and firms anticipating attempts by authorities to manipulate monetary and 
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fiscal policies (McCallum, 1978). His findings, although not strong, showed that the USA 
administration could not affect unemployment rates and so had no means by which to induce 
pre-electoral booms to sway voters – disproving the PBC theories put forward by Nordhaus in 
1975 and MacRae in 1977 (McCallum, 1978).  
Beck (1987) looked for evidence of political monetary cycles (PMCs) in the USA and whether 
the Federal Reserve created the cycles or accommodated them. He found that although the 
Federal Reserve did not cause such cycles given the large costs they would incur if caught, they 
passively accommodated PMCs that were fiscally induced by the powers of the president on 
other economic policies (Beck, 1987). Since fiscal policymaking in the USA is done jointly by 
the President and Congress, it is a lengthy cumbersome process, which takes more than a year 
until implementation. Monetary policymaking, on the other hand, is much simpler, flexible and 
is done by the Federal Reserve, which is an independent and nonpartisan agency that cannot 
be controlled by the executive arm of the government. In his study, Beck (1987) found positive 
evidence of cycles in money supply (increasing sharply during an election year) that were not 
caused by the Federal Reserve. The findings in his study showed that the Federal Reserve does 
not take any actions to offset them but they instead respond to fiscal policy that affects variables 
such as inflation.   
Alesina (1987) found that in a two-party system e.g. the USA, it would be beneficial for the 
parties to agree to more similar policies and in so doing create less disruption after a change in 
administration and avoid PBCs. Rogoff, and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990), both argued that 
although developed economies have efficient markets and rational behavior, they are still likely 
to experience political cycles due to: asymmetric information between voters and policymakers 
(Rogoff and Sibert, 1988), rational ignorance among voters, uncertainty over the outcome of 
an election and long-run uncertainty (Rogoff, 1990).  
Keech and Pak (1989) observed robust electoral cycles in a cluster of veterans’ benefit 
programs between 1961 and 1978 but they could not attribute them to an increasing public-
sector growth. They used a linear regression with generalized least squares (GLS) estimates on 
USA quarterly data for the 17-year period. Incumbents preferred the aforementioned programs 
as a target for political gains over other programs such as the unemployment benefits program 
that was similar in size and also unindexed. The government began to index veterans’ benefits 
in 1978, right after Tufte’s Political Control of the Economy book and this saw transfer 
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payments cycles reduce substantially and there was no evidence of them thereafter (Keech and 
Pak, 1989).  
Grier (1989) used quarterly USA data from 1961 to 1982 to identify the political links present 
between fiscal and monetary policies. He found the presence of a four-year electoral cycle in 
M1 money growth, which proved the existence of political monetary cycles during that period.  
Furthermore, his regressive analysis on the residual electoral cycles yielded results consistent 
with PBC movements in inflation (minimal in the quarter before elections) and output 
(maximal in the quarter of the election). In his study, Grier (1989) concluded that the Federal 
Reserve is likely to actively pursue a PMC to the advantage of incumbent president given the 
substantial influence that presidential elections have on interest rates, deficits and the GNP.  
Haynes and Stone (1989) made two notable empirical contributions to the electoral model of 
business cycles. First, they were the first to present the unrestricted estimates of presidential 
electoral patterns in the US economic outcomes i.e. real GNP, unemployment and inflation and 
policy effects on money growth and the cyclically adjusted budget surplus. In assuming this 
approach, Haynes and Stone (1989) contrasted the approach in previous studies whose tests 
were subjected to ad hoc restrictions that weakened the power of the tests. Secondly, Haynes 
and Stone (1989) went on to provide an integrated test of the electoral model by examining 
whether the estimated electoral patterns in macro policy yield predicted patterns for the real 
GNP, unemployment and inflation that are consistent with estimates of actual electoral patterns 
in macroeconomic outcomes and voting behavior.  The results of their study which used 
quarterly data for the period from 1951 Q1 to 1986 Q2, showed that the four-year electoral 
cycles in macro-economic outcomes and policies were strongly significant in the USA  
In a similar vein, Haynes and Stone (1990) used the same data set as in their 1989 study and 
found that the abovementioned electoral cycles were significant for Republican incumbents, 
supporting the notion that partisan cycles are significant. Their findings from specification tests 
showed that during Democratic administrations, there were higher real GNP and inflation 
levels while unemployment levels were low (Haynes and Stone, 1990). As a result of this 
finding, they concluded the majority party found itself to be more flexible to pursue partisan 
objectives. 
In 1994, Haynes and Stones conducted another study based on time-series literature with 
emphasis on statistical properties of measures of real economic activity and structural business 
cycle literature to determine how political factors play a role in real economic activity. With 
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an information set that had the political party of the incumbent president and the quarter of the 
electoral term from 1951 to 1990, their study found that party affiliation of the president and 
the timing of the electoral period statistically informed over a third of the variation in measures 
of real economic activity for the USA (Haynes and Stones, 1994).  
Klein (1996) tested the timing of economic events relative to political events to examine if 
there are any temporal links in the US business cycle for the period from 1855 to 1991. He 
used duration analysis to test whether the 31 observed business cycles had turning points that 
were affected by the occurrence and outcome of an election. His study found a significant 
increase in the likelihood of the end of a contraction in the 2-year period before an election 
when there was a Democratic president and a higher likelihood of the end of an expansion 
occurring in any given month following Republican presidential victories (Klein, 1996). 
Consistent with PBC theory and evidence by many researchers, Klein (1996) also found that 
expansions are more likely to end soon after elections.  
In contrast, Faust and Irons (1999) conducted a study whose findings opposed PBC theory and 
concluded that economic activity strongly predicts election outcomes and not the other way 
around. They used a standard vector auto regressive framework on quarterly USA data from 
1948 to 1995 to test how electoral cycles influenced the unemployment rate, interest rate, 
inflation, GNP growth and M2 growth and found no evidence of political effects on the USA 
macro economy through monetary policy. They found weak evidence from fiscal policy for the 
first half of republican administration that experienced recessions as predicted by partisan PBC 
theory.    
In Spain, Balageur-Coll et al. (2015) sought to find how significant public spending amongst 
was in determining re-election in Spain’s local governments over the period from 2003 to 2007. 
He focused on municipal elections despite that the power in local governments is lower (due 
to decentralization) and that there is a high degree of autonomy in terms of budget planning. 
He applied a Bayesian approach1 relative to the frequentist approach used in most studies. His 
study found that municipal spending increased over term in office to boost the re-election 
                                                          
1 A feature of the Bayesian method is that a given variable is neither significant nor non-
significant but instead its result provides a full posterior probability distribution on how a 
given covariate might affect the probability of being re-elected. This method also adds extra 
robustness to the findings.    
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prospects; and that pre-election increases in current expenditure were found to be more 
rewarding relative to capital expenditure, because capital expenditure took time to complete.  
4.3 Evidence of PBC from groups of industrialized developed economies  
 
In his 1978 book, Tufte observed electoral-economic cycles in national elections held in the 
USA and other capitalist industrialized democracies post World War II from 1946 to 1976. In 
Tufte observed that real disposable income per capita rose during the election years and fell 
after the election years while unemployment fell before elections and rose afterwards (Tufte, 
1978). Furthermore, he found that presidents increased transfer payments to social security and 
veteran programs right before elections and facilitated a delay in tax increments until after 
elections. In his conclusion, he urged the press and opposition parties looking to compete in 
elections to expose the narrow-minded and detrimental economic policies of the incumbents 
(Tufte, 1978).  
Paldam (1979), examined 17 OECD countries with 49 stable governments from 1948 to 1975 
to test if electoral cycles exist in 8 main national accounts: GDP, GFI (Gross Factor Income), 
Private Consumption, Government Consumption, Fixed Investments, Taxes, Exports and 
Imports. He defined a ‘stable’ government as one where the government has a parliamentary 
majority and remains in power through the normal election period. Using data based on various 
national accounts series, he computed component series for each of the accounts to get the 
current growth rate, real growth rate and growth in implicit price deflators. He found 
statistically weak evidence for a policy-generated cycle, which led him to claim that the cycles 
were caused by foreign trade prices. This was considered evidence in support of the theory 
predictions that governments have little control over events (Paldam, 1979).    
Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) and Paldam (2004) developed the responsibility hypothesis 
that states that the electorate considers the government to be responsible for the country’s 
economic performance and that different levels of governments show different effects, with the 
electorate “punishing” local governments for poor management of budgets allocated to them 
relative to the counterparts in the national governments.  
Bachman (1992) examined the effect that political risk as characterized by elections, has on the 
forward exchange bias. His goal was to find an explanation for the observed time-varying risk 
premium in foreign exchange markets with political events being his main driver. He analyzed 
data from 13 elections in Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the USA between 1973 and 
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1985. The countries he included in his sample have partisan political systems with voters 
having to vote for one of two parties. In his study, he highlighted the informational value of 
elections to investors especially on the adoption of different economic policies which are likely 
to alter the value of a country’s assets. Estimations by regression coefficients from his study 
showed that after half of the elections, the average forward bias changed significantly 
(Bachman, 1992). 
 
Ellis and Thoma (1995) conducted a study to investigate the predictions of two open economy 
models in which partisan effects are present. The first model assumed a small country- one-
good model of exchange rate determination while the second assumed that two countries 
specialize in the production of one good (Ellis and Thoma, 1995). The first model was used to 
predict the time paths of exchange rates and to explain why systematic differences may exist 
between future spot rates and risk adjusted forward exchange rates. The second was used to 
predict the behaviour of terms of trade, the current account and exchange rates (Ellis and 
Thoma, 1995). Their empirical analysis used panel regression of time series cross sectional 
data based on quarterly data of 14 OECD countries from 1960 to 1987 and from 1960 to 1992. 
Empirical results from their study supported the theoretical predictions that systemic partisan 
effects were present in current accounts, real exchange rates and terms of trade (Ellis and 
Thoma, 1995).   
Gartner (1999) looked at the different empirical implications that naïve (backward looking) 
and rational retrospective (forward-looking) voters have on the inflation rate during election 
periods. He used an auto regressive model on the change in inflation using quarterly panel data 
from the G-7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, UK and the US) for the period 
1961 to 1992. He found significant statistical evidence of election patterns due to persistence 
of demand shocks and that monetary policy was used as a tool to appeal to retrospective voters 
(Gartner, 1999). Furthermore, his study found that a higher level of independence of central 
banks from the government and a drop-in persistency in output after demand shocks led to a 
reduction in the inflationary bias (Gartner, 1999).  
Carlsen (1999) used quarterly data on 50 elections in six OECD countries (USA, U.K., Canada, 
Australia, Sweden and Norway) from 1955 to 1994 to investigate the relation between post-
electoral inflation movement and the incumbent’s re-election chances. He did panel data 
regressions combined with estimations of election win probabilities for incumbents and 
factoring for variable and fixed electoral terms in the sample countries. His results show 
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positive evidence for above average post-election inflation if the election race is close but not 
if the incumbent’s election prospects are very good or poor (Carlsen, 1999).   
Persson and Tabellini (2003) investigated political budget cycles in developed economies in 
60 democracies from 1960 to 1998. Their study was the first to zone in on the impact of both 
the political regime (parliamentary versus presidential) and the electoral rule (proportional 
versus majority) on PBCs. Their hypothesis was that majoritarian elections have “stronger 
individual accountability” in comparison to proportional elections where the electoral rules 
incentivize politicians to advocate for broad policy programs. Majoritarian elections were 
observed to have politicians who directed spending towards smaller geographic locations that 
had swing voters. Their findings illustrated stronger cycles in countries that had majoritarian 
presidential regimes due to the concentration of policymaking power in the hands of a few 
figures (Persson & Tabellini, 2003).  
Mink and de Haan (2006) tested for political budget cycles in 12 countries in the Euro area that 
had adopted the Euro currency from 1999 to 2004. They inputted net lending, cyclically 
adjusted net lending and primary budget balance into a multivariate model with an election 
variable suggested by Franzese (2000) as opposed to a dummy electoral variable used in most 
PBC studies. Their findings showed strong evidence of policy makers in the Euro area pursuing 
expansionary policies before elections despite the 1997 implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) in the EU. The SGP aims were to “prevent fiscal policies from heading in 
potentially problematic directions, while others are there to correct excessive budget deficits 
or excessive public debt burdens” (European Commission, 2015). Mink and de Haan (2006) 
found that budget deficits increased in election years but not in the year prior to elections. The 
results also showed a small significant partisan effect on net lending with more expansionary 
measures enacted under left-wing policy-makers.  
Tujula and Wolswijk (2007) did a study to test election year effects on budget balance changes 
in 22 OECD and EU countries for the period 1970 to 2002. Using panel regression analysis on 
the 713 observations, they found that budget balances deteriorated by about 0.3% of GDP in 
election years and that there was a deliberate use of fiscal expansion to get electoral support 
(Tujula and Wolswijk, 2007). The coefficient obtained suggested there was a lack of 
parliamentary backing for government actions in the event of unfavorable macroeconomic or 
budgetary developments and that fiscal tampering reflected a strategic attempt by an outgoing 
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government to limit the room for operation for a new government with a new political or 
economic ideology (Tujula and Wolswijk, 2007).  
Klasnja (2008) conducted an empirical survey on whether electoral cycles in total expenditures 
and revenues differ systematically among transition countries with different political systems 
i.e. majoritarian presidential systems (Eastern Europe and Central Asia) versus proportional-
parliamentary systems (Central and South Eastern Europe and the Baltics). He used annual data 
for 25 post-communist transition countries that held 135 elections from 1990 to 2006. He found 
that taxes were cut and targeted outlays were increased before elections only in countries with 
majoritarian presidential governments while revenues were consolidated after elections only in 
countries with proportional-parliamentary systems (Klasnja, 2008). The results showed that 
ineffective constitutional checks and balances intended to separate power, prevailed in 
presidential regimes than in parliamentary ones leading to more wastefulness, limited 
accountability and negative externalities in fiscal composition around elections.   
Klose (2012) examined PBCs in monetary policy in a sample of 16 OECD countries - Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and USA. He applied a two-dimensional 
asymmetric Taylor reaction function and a panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) on 
monthly data from 1975 to 2010 on inflation, interest rates and output (GDP). The Taylor 
function shows how the central bank “reacts to deviations of the inflation rate from its target 
and to deviations of the output from its potential, i.e. the so-called output gap” (Klose, 2012, 
p. 269) before and after an election. Klose (2012), after finding PBCs as evidenced by inflation 
and output movements, concluded that the central banks in the OECD countries lack 
independence, despite the conventional view that they are.  
Chang et al. (2013) conducted a study to investigate the political and economic factors that 
affect business cycles in 14 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010. The countries studied were 
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Netherland, Norway, 
New Zealand, Portugal, United Kingdom, and USA. They used panel data and incorporated 
the traditional and rational partisan theories of PBC into an open economy framework to allow 
for synchronization of business cycles. Their main finding was that economic policies and the 
political environment significantly influence business cycles in the countries and correlations 
across the countries alike (Chang et al, 2013). Specific to the political factors, they found mixed 
evidence of PBC in the member countries when applying the traditional partisan theory by 
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Hibbs (1977) but the rational partisan theory by Alesina (1987) showed a robust link between 
partisan ideologies and output co-movements (Chang et al, 2013). In addition, they found that 
the similarity in the type of parties (left or right wing) holding office in countries is an important 
source of shocks across countries (Chang et al, 2013).  
 
In a study that included countries from developed and developing countries, Klomp and De 
Haan (2013) examined political budget cycles in 70 democratic countries from 1970 to 2007. 
They used a pooled mean group (PMG) estimator on a cross-country time series dataset instead 
of the frequently applied GMM estimator for dynamic panel models to control for panel 
heterogeneity. The variables used for their model were GDP per Capita, real GDP growth, 
Inflation rate, Unemployment rate, an election dummy variable, a globalization level variable, 
age dependency ratio and a partisan variable to control for left or right-wing governments. 
Their results showed that there was significant evidence of electoral effects on fiscal policy in 
the short run for some but not all the countries. As further analysis, Klomp and De Haan (2013) 
went on to evaluate the countries that had PBC occurrences and found that the level of 
occurrence was conditional to the level of development and democracy, government 
transparency, the country’s political system, membership of a monetary union and the degree 
of political polarisation (Klomp and De Haan, 2013).  
 
Adam (2014) studied 86 elections in 14 European Union countries from 1985 to 2010 to 
identify what effect elections had on economic sentiment. He found that there was statistically 
and economically significant improvement in sentiment the month when elections occurred but 
that it was short-lived, i.e. lasting less than 2 months – a sign of public irrationality. The 
indicators that Adam (2014) used to track the state of the economy were unemployment and 
the inflation rate. The changes in the unemployment rate were found to be significant but 
changes in the inflation rate were not. There are other reasons that explain the irrational 
behaviour of economic agents such as the “weekend effect” and the “January effect”, both of 
which are beyond the scope of this study.  
 
4.4 Evidence of PBC from single developing economies  
Empirical studies on developing countries focused mainly on the Opportunistic and Rational 





In Israel, Ben-Porath (1975) studied the government and observed the implementation of a new 
tax system with a bid to curb high inflation levels that followed the 1973 elections and war 
Ben-Porath part of a five-man committee that was delegated by the government to come up 
with the new tax system. The results of the 1975 study found positive PBC evidence in taxes 
as the variable that the government chose to influence (Ben-Porath, 1975). Brender (2003) 
looked at the Israeli economy and found a positive relation between fiscal policy and PBC, 
consistent with Ben-Porath’s (1975) findings in Israel.      
 
In Turkey, Krueger and Turan (1993) analysed a set of fiscal aggregates from 1950 and 1980 
and found positive evidence of PBC effects which were driven by pre-electoral expenditure 
policies aimed at swaying voters into re-electing the ruling party. The findings showed that the 
investment programs were extended to unsustainable levels before elections and then scaled 
down substantially thereafter to the detriment of the general public. The effects of this 
turnaround in investment hurt individuals in the lower income brackets who ironically made 
up a sizeable portion of the entire voting population.   
 
In Africa, Fouda (1997) conducted a study on Cameroon from 1960 to 1992 based on a political 
monetary cycle framework. A noteworthy point is that Cameroon’s monetary policy is 
determined by the Reserve Bank of Cameroon but Cameroon is part of a monetary union, the 
BEAC CFA Zone that has an independent central bank. Fouda (1997) used the dating reference 
cycles method which involves discovering regularities on a given time series, after which he 
applied the Dickey-Fuller econometric test to analyse the presidential and parliamentarian 
electoral data.  He found positive evidence of election cycles in monetary growth that lasted 
for about seven to eight months. Furthermore, the Fouda (1997) study showed that the central 
bank lacked credibility, as it had no sanctions in place for members that manipulated monetary 
aggregates and this threatened the proper functioning of the monetary union (Fouda, 1997).  
 
Ergun (2000) studied the Turkish government from 1985 to 1999 to determine if they 
influenced inflation levels prior to elections through policy change. He used a monthly data 
test for fiscal and monetary policy indicators alongside important economic policy instruments 
and indicators that were extensive for budget items. Through the use of an autoregressive model 
that applied an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology alongside a Hausman Specification 
test, he found statistically significant evidence that confirmed that the Turkish government used 
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expansionary fiscal policies prior to elections by increasing government expenditures and 
dropping tax revenues (Ergun, 2000). Furthermore, he found statistically significant evidence 
for the adoption of pre-election expansionary monetary policies through an increase in money 
supply and declining interest rates which in turn caused inflation to increase post elections 
(Ergun, 2000). 
 
In Mexico, Gonzales (2002) conducted an econometric analysis to examine if Mexico’s time-
varying degree of democracy affected the manner in which economic policy was chosen as 
elections approached. She studied Mexico’s fiscal policy choices between 1957 and 1997 and 
found that the government creatively used public spending in infrastructure and current 
transfers as a way of earning votes prior to federal elections (Gonzales, 2002). Mexico, like 
other Latin American countries, has been subject to swings in their political systems that made 
them more or less democratic regardless of elections taking place as scheduled (Gonzales, 
2002). Her study aimed to determine whether the effect was stronger as democratization made 
elections so competitive that politicians were incentivised to increase visible government 
expenditure or democratization that increased the transparency of the economy to the point that 
voters had a better understanding of incumbents’ competence. Gonzales (2002) concluded that 
the Mexican government turned to pre-election spending to counter the growing threat of the 
ruling party losing power because of democratization.  
 
In India, Khemani (2004) examined the election effects in 14 Indian States and found evidence 
of policy manipulation that was geared towards benefiting special interest groups in return for 
campaign support (financial and mobilization through local influence) as opposed to the 
mainstream populist spending sprees that targeted large voter masses from 1960 to 1992. The 
state legislative elections reviewed in this study are crucial, as the elected leaders are 
responsible for electing the president.  Khemani (2004) found no significant evidence of broad 
based fiscal expansions in pre-electoral periods as overall spending on public services and on 
state fiscal deficits remained unchanged. However, the evidence pointed at pre-electoral 
targeting of special groups rendered critical for electoral victory through tax breaks for small 
groups of producers and spending on public investment projects such as road construction in 
exchange for campaign support. These forms of manipulation were used because voters in India 
had begun to scrutinize large spending increases and tax rate cuts and were less likely to be 
influenced by it since experience had shown that they had short-term benefits that were easily 




In Turkey, Karagol and Turhan (2008) tested for evidence of partisan and electoral effects in 
external debt and defence expenditure from 1960 to 2002. They found positive evidence of 
partisan over electoral effect shocks in the defence expenditure, which meant that political 
ideology of the government influenced fiscal policy choice and consequently the defence 
expenditure. However, post-election increments in defence expenditure could be interpreted to 
be an inheritance from previous governments that had used it to draw voters according to Ergun 
(2000).  
 
In Brazil, Hiroi (2009) conducted a study to test the policy consequences of electoral cycles 
and exchange rate regime choices from 1985 to 2006. In that period, Brazil had six different 
currencies and nine major stabilization plans for its currency and economy. Hiroi (2009) used 
Brazil’s disaggregated monthly data for a time-series regression analysis on fiscal and 
monetary policy variables namely: inflation rate, interest rate, GDP growth, exchange rate, 
money supply and budget balance. He found significant electorally induced fiscal cycles under 
fixed and crawling peg exchange rate regimes as evidenced by deteriorating budget balances 
during election years and electorally induced monetary cycles under floating exchange rates as 
evidenced by a 2.83% increase in money supply in election years (Hiroi, 2009). However, Hiroi 
further observed that electorally induced monetary cycles under floating exchange rates only 
occurred due to the nation’s central bank lacking independence, as was the case with Brazil 
over the said period.  
 
4.5 Evidence of PBC from groups of developing economies  
 
In Latin America, Ames (1987) used central government data from 17 Latin American 
countries between 1947 and 1982 to determine if in the lead up to elections, the government 
used budgetary allocations to garner support. High levels of institutional instability dominated 
Latin America and incumbents took advantage of this by using public funds to strengthen their 
political base and increase their re-election chances. Incumbents were seen to ‘reward’ 
supporters as elections drew closer while newly elects increased spending to the public after 
elections (Ames, 1987). The study looked at various patterns of expenditure in military, health, 
welfare and education among countries. On average, Ames observed that government 





Building on work done by Ames in 1987, Remmer (1993) studied eight Latin America 
countries from 1980 to 1991, selecting countries that had weak institutions, high poverty levels 
and economic instability in order to test for PBCs. He made use of an interrupted time-series 
analysis and found no evidence for pre-electoral influence in government deficits, money 
supply changes, inflation and exchange depreciation. However, Remmer (1993) found mixed 
evidence of PBC effects in economic outcomes for the post-electoral period mainly due to 
varying policy-making infrastructures present in the countries considered for her study.  These 
findings opposed prior research stating that leaders in Latin America pursued policies with 
short-term material payoffs that maximised electoral support but destroyed long-term 
economic performance (Remmer, 1993).  Furthermore, Remmer (1993, p.393) observed that 
competitive elections improved rather than undermined “the capacity of political leaders to 
address outstanding problems of macroeconomic management”. This observation was critical 
because Latin American economies had to adapt to “a new internationally defined and policed 
economic orthodoxy” (Remmer, 1993, p.395) narrowing the policy choices their leaders could 
make at a time when many nations in the region were dealing with debt crises.    
 
In Chile, Edwards (1994) conducted a study between 1952 and 1973 to understand the political 
economy of inflation and stabilization in developing countries. Using a series of recent models, 
Edwards found that inflation tax depends positively on the level of political stability in a 
country. His findings were consistent with the notion that certain policy actions pursued by 
government are strategically done to benefit from inflationary financing (Edwards, 1994). In 
addition to this finding, he further examined the role of the six congressional elections held 
plus 4 presidential elections, of which the former had been overlooked by prior studies and he 
found that these elections had also contributed positively to PBC during the said period. As a 
result, Edwards (1994, p.262) concluded that, “political variables have affected in a systematic 
way the economic developments in developing countries”.  
 
Schuknecht (1996) used annual data on 35 developing countries from 1972 to 1992 to examine 
the impact that elections had on economic policymaking. The results showed that the 
implementation of expansionary fiscal policies during the pre-election cycle increased fiscal 
deficits by more than 0.6 percent of GDP (Schuknecht, 1996). Furthermore, fiscal 
consolidation took place after elections because of the contractionary effects of the policies 
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that were implemented during the pre-election period. In addition to the above, Schuknecht 
(1996) found that the cycles in fiscal policies were more significant in economies that were 
less trade-oriented and where IMF-supported programs aided fiscal stabilization.  
 
As a follow up on his 1996 study, Schuknecht (1999) examined the fiscal policies around 
elections in 25 developing countries from 1978 to 1992. His focus was on whether a flexible 
or fixed exchange rate regime was susceptible to expansionary fiscal policies in the lead up to 
elections. He conducted regression analysis using annual panel data of countrywide general, 
legislative or presidential elections. Results showed that for a limited sample of non-African 
developing countries with fixed exchange rates and sufficient reserves, governments resorted 
to expansionary fiscal policies that positively affected public expenditure (both current and 
capital) to improve their chance of re-election. In a book released in 2000, Schuknecht and 
Tanzi found that election-oriented policy affected the expenditure side more than tax cuts 
because increased public spending had direct and immediate impacts while the tax cuts were 
inefficient since the tax bases were small in developing countries (Tanzi & Schuknecht, 2000).  
 
Drazen (2000) conducted a critical review on the lessons learnt from existing PBC research 
conducted for over 25 years, through a review of both the opportunistic and partisan PBC 
models. He found that models based on electoral manipulation via monetary policy were 
questionable both theoretically and empirically while those based on fiscal policy manipulation 
conformed better to data and constituted a solid foundation for a compelling theoretical model 
(Drazen, 2000). He wanted to find a causal relationship between the fiscal and monetary cycles 
and to determine whether existent monetary cycles could be explained by fiscal cycles. In his 
study, Drazen (2000) proposed a new model based on the Rogoff (1990) rational opportunistic 
model of a political budget cycle combined with monetary policy controlled by a separate 
monetary authority. He called his model the “active-fiscal, passive-monetary” (AFPM) model 
of opportunistic PBCs. One of the model’s main arguments was that the role of an independent 
central bank in a fiscal induced PBC was not to exacerbate the cycle but to offset the fiscal 
effects that would drive up interest rates (Drazen, 2000).  
 
Block (2002) conducted a cross-country study that covered 44 Sub-Saharan African countries 
that held presidential elections from 1980 to 1995. The reason for focusing on presidential 
elections only was that they pose a more direct threat to power relative to legislative elections. 
Using panel data, he employed a GMM estimator alongside OLS and fixed effects method as 
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the methods for analysing the results. Block (2002) sought to identify electoral interventions 
in five monetary and four fiscal policy variables. In his study, he observed a pattern of 
electorally timed interventions in monetary policy instruments through monetary expansion 
and lower interest rates in election years followed by increased inflation and seigniorage after 
the elections. With respect to fiscal policy manipulation, Block (2002) found that fiscal deficits, 
government consumption, public spending (current over capital expenditures) and net claims 
on the government increased during election years with post-election declines only clear in 
fiscal deficits and public expenditures.  
 
Block et al. (2003) used macroeconomic data from African economies from 1980 to 1995 to 
test the hypotheses that PBCs are evident in competitive multiparty elections and that larger 
cycles should only be visible in founding elections2. Most African economies only became 
democratised during the sample period and as such lacked independent monetary institutions 
and had weak legislatures. Block et al (2003) found that of the 65 elections studied, 22 were 
founding elections. Their study, which analysed five macroeconomic variables relevant to the 
African countries found strong evidence of electorally timed interventions in fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate policy for competitive elections (Block et al, 2003). They also observed 
large monetary interventions and greater cycles of fiscal policy interventions for the case of 
founding elections (Block et al, 2003).  
 
4.6 Evidence of PBC from a mix of both developed and developing economies  
 
Shi and Svensson (2002) examined fiscal policy in a sample of 91 countries for the period 1975 
to 1995 and found evidence of PBC in government consumption, tax revenues and the fiscal 
deficit increasing by 1% of GDP in election years. They also found that the cycles were of 
greater magnitude in developing than in developed countries. Expanding on their 2002 study, 
Shi and Svensson (2003, 2006) discussed models that proposed that political budget cycles 
arose because of a moral hazard problem of the competence approach. The argument proffered 
in their study was that all politicians face the same incentives regardless of their competence 
and that specific incentives depend on the politico-institutional environment a politician finds 
himself or herself in (Shi and Svensson, 2003, 2006). Through the use of large panel data, they 
                                                          
2 Founding elections are elections in which “the office of head of government was openly contested following 
a period during which multiparty politics had been denied” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997) 
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found that the more private benefits politicians gain when in power, the stronger their 
incentives to influence the voters’ perceptions prior to elections and thus the larger the size of 
political budget cycles (Shi and Svensson, 2003).  
 
Brender and Drazen (2005) sought to find the existence of political budget cycles in a sample 
of developed and developing economies, to prove that pre-election manipulation is useful to 
get voter support, and that voters punish rather than reward fiscal manipulation. They used an 
OLS regression with country fixed effects on a data set of 68 countries over the period from 
1960 to 2001, focusing on central government balance, total expenditure and total revenue and 
grants. They found that political budget cycles characterised by increased expenditure in 
election years in “new democracies” significantly caused a political deficit cycle in a large 
cross-section of countries, which disappeared when they were removed from the sample 
(Brender and Drazen, 2005). These “new democracies” were mostly developing countries that 
were susceptible to fiscal manipulation because voters were inexperienced with elections 
and/or lacked information to evaluate fiscal changes.  
 
Following their 2005 study, Brender and Drazen (2008), conducted another study using data 
from 350 election campaigns in 74 democracies from 1960 to 2003 to examine the direct effect 
of fiscal performance and economic growth on voter behaviour and re-election chances on a 
national level. Their analysis found that an increase in the government’s budget deficit in an 
election year did not increase an incumbent’s chance of re-election in all the countries they 
studied. Instead, incumbents were punished at the polls for increasing government spending in 
an election year in developed and established economies (Brender and Drazen, 2008). They 
also observed that budget deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent’s term led to significantly 
lower chances of re-election, hence, proving that voters were indeed fiscally conservative and 
looked at performance of the entire office term rather than just the electoral year figures 
(Brender and Drazen, 2008). In contrast to the findings based on developed countries, their 
findings on developing countries were consistent with their 2005 study. Brender and Drazen 
(2008) found that, in less developed countries and new democracies, high growth rates of real 
GDP per capita over an incumbent’s term signalled strong economic performance to voters and 
led to a significant increase in the incumbent’s chances of being re-elected.  
 
Vergne (2009) used data from 42 developing countries from 1975 to 2001 with special focus 
on the overall budget dynamics and how public spending fluctuated due to electoral 
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composition influence. His findings showed that in an election-year, public spending was 
directed towards more visible current expenditures such as wages and subsidies and got 
redirected from capital expenditure and that the impact of these changes in allocation lasted 
despite countries gaining experience in electoral politics (Vergne, 2009). His study supported 
the theory of politicians preferring broad-based spending at election times although he did 
highlight that as countries got experienced and were able to identify the spending deficits, 
voters would punish politicians and kick them out of office. 
 
Chauvett and Collier (2009) deviated from the norm of using economic variables to test for 
PBC and instead looked at the structural and cyclical impact of elections on economic policies 
and governance in 82 developing countries over the period from 1978 to 2004. The core 
measure they used was the Country Policy and Institution Assessment (CPIA) annual ratings 
developed by World Bank covering 20 different aspects of economic policy and institutions in 
130 countries since 1977. A regression analysis found elections to have both cyclical and 
structural effects; cyclical effects suggest that the mid-term is the fitting moment for policy 
change and periods leading up to elections are unfavourable for policy improvement (Chauvett 
and Collier, 2009). Structural effects suggest that a higher frequency of elections improves 
policy and governance net of any cyclical effects unless the electoral process is conducted 
poorly (Chauvett and Collier, 2009). As a result of their findings, Chauvett and Collier 
concluded that honest elections increase accountability and discipline governments to improve 
economic policy and governance and that international organisations should push developing 
countries to achieve this.  
 
Brender & Drazen (2013) conducted another study on 71 democracies over the period from 
1972 to 2009, with the objective of identifying changes in government spending before and 
after elections relative to changes in leadership. The three main findings in their study were 
that: elections had no material short run effects on expenditure as it takes time to effect changes; 
over the medium term, large composition changes were observed in developing economies and 
lastly, in election years, the expenditure composition changes tended to be greater in 
established than in new democracies. The last finding above was supported by the evidence 
that showed that the longer the leadership’s tenure in office, the greater the change in 




A recent trend that is developing in PBC research is one in which the presence and magnitude 
of electoral fiscal cycles are thought to be conditional on certain institutional, political and 
economic contexts. One of this context was the past support variable for incumbent 
governments which assumed that a persistence of support, possible inertia at the polls and better 
results in a past election all contributed to having more support in the next election. (Aidt et 
al., 2011; Brender and Drazen, 2005; Franzese and Jusko, 2006; Rose, 2006; Schneider, 2010; 
Shi and Svensson, 2006; Vergne, 2009). This trend also highlights the signalling effect of PBC 
where incumbents’ competence was signalled by changing composition of budget in electoral 
years through the provision of more visible and electorally effective expenditures (Drazen and 
Eslava, 2010).  
4.7 Evidence on the possible link between PBC and sovereign credit rating action 
 
This section seeks to review literature that investigates the link between PBC and credit rating 
action. Similar to this study, researchers have used macroeconomic variables to test for PBC 
evidence then proceeded to utilise the same variables in a model that computes a credit rating 
outcome that is then compared to actual rating(s) by one or all of the three main CRAs. This 
study follows a similar methodology in the sense that it uses macroeconomic variables in a 
model and considers the ratings provided by the three main CRAs. 
CRAs are private companies that provide sovereign credit ratings, which reflect a country’s 
perceived willingness and ability to repay its sovereign debt in full and on time (Chen et al., 
2013) given its political, social and economic state. These ratings determine the rated countries’ 
access to international capital markets, predict the likelihood of sovereign defaults and reduce 
monitoring costs for lenders and investors. Sovereign credit ratings can indirectly boost the 
demand of a sovereign’s bond offering through the signalling of improved transparency, 
country risk levels and investor protection. They can also provide a mechanism to weaken 
financially repressive sovereign regimes as low ratings consequently yield low capital inflows 
which then pressures the regime to be responsible with its current funds and resources.  
CRAs publish letter-grade sovereign ratings on a 6- or 16- point ordinal scale understandable 
by capital market participants (Block et al., 2003). CRAs also provide reviews - also called 
Watch lists and outlook reports. A review can be for an upgrade or a downgrade. It is an opinion 
by a CRA highlighting its concerns or developments in the current rating of a sovereign over 
the next three months. Reviews indicate the active analysis CRAs are conducting to determine 
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whether the current ratings should change (Lexicon, 2017). Outlook reports are prepared by a 
rating agency analyst and distributed via a press release available on CRA’s websites. They 
indicate the analyst’s forecast of the future rating of a sovereign. The forecast can either 
improve, decline or remain unchanged. A large proportion of changes in the outlook precede a 
change in rating. The ratings are pertinent for pricing and hedging risky fixed-income securities 
of corporate, municipal and sovereign issuers especially if the rating is below the investment 
grade level3.   
  
Emerging markets have over the last decade attracted significant interest in the global market 
space and consequently drawn international players in the financial sector to invest in them. In 
earlier years of the 20th Century, CRAs only released ratings on developed and industrialised 
economies. These countries had to pay for the ratings, creating an income stream for CRAs but 
also raising a conflict of interest4 dilemma. It was possible to produce ratings for specific 
countries as data from those economies was available and reliable to use. However, after a few 
market crises, CRAs had to be regulated first through the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
(“the 2006 Act”), and then through the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act according to Hanusch and Vaaler 
(2013).  The two academics also found that CRAs were in a position to play a positive role in 
emerging democracies as private guardians of public fiscal discipline. This conclusion was 
arrived at after conducting econometric analyses on 18 emerging democracies that held 32 
presidential elections from 1989 to 2004. After the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008, which 
CRAs took part of the blame for5, CRAs needed to be more thorough in their assessments 
especially of emerging markets that were having investors flocking into them in search for 
growth and diversification. The demand for sovereign ratings also increased due to the 
inevitable globalization of markets.  
International lenders often look to sovereigns to provide implicit and explicit payment 
guarantees to private borrowers. The sovereigns’ financial institutions in both local and foreign 
currencies play a crucial role in this regard, but also, private debt issuers’ credit rating is 
                                                          
3 An indicator of the quality of your fixed income and debt offerings. This level is a rating of ‘BBB’ or higher by 
S&P, Moody’s or Fitch.  
4 The Conflict of Interest could arise from agencies being incentivized to give more positive ratings to 
sovereigns, increasing their FDI and thus increasing the demand for ratings. This will make the role of ratings 
attractive for unrated countries which then approach the agencies for ratings.  
5 CRAs took part of the blame as they assigned high ratings to the institutions and structured financial products 
such as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that were at the heart of 
the crisis. There was limited information on these products and high ratings were the cause of heightened 
investor interest in them (Bahena, 2010).  
74 
 
bounded from above by their respective country’s sovereign ratings. Sovereign credit ratings 
are considered to be a reference measure of country risk (Pretorius & Botha, 2017). The number 
of developing countries rated by CRAs jumped from 12 in 1987 to 51 in 1997 and was around 
70 in the early 2000s – the number has not grown much further due to most developing 
countries’ data being unavailable. This clearly shows that the need for risk information on 
developing countries increased rapidly and thus credit ratings stepped in to address the issue 
of information asymmetry and transparency that are associated with emerging markets. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that many institutional investors investing in developing countries are 
required to hold securities with ratings above a certain threshold (Cantor & Packer, 1996)   
There is a vast array of factors that can be used to determine the sovereign default risk (the risk 
that a government will not fully pay back public debt) of a country and in turn its credit rating 
level. These factors can be either quantitative or qualitative but not limited to “macroeconomic, 
government performance and other explanatory variables” (Afonso, Gomes, & Rother, 2007). 
One such factor is the level of decentralization (fiscal and/or political.) A study by Eichler and 
Hofmann (2013) found that higher levels of fiscal decentralization significantly increase 
sovereign default risk in emerging countries especially through high levels of 
intergovernmental transfers. These transfers worsen the common pool problem6 by providing 
incentives to implement unsustainable fiscal policies at the subnational level (municipal and 
provincial departments) and then having the federal governments bail them out leading to 
unsustainable debt levels.  
Other determinants of sovereign risk identified and documented in various academic studies 
are: high public debt levels by Edwards, 1984, 1986; Dailami et al., 2008; Manasse and 
Roubini, 2009; political business cycles by Block and Vaaler, 2004; the design of the political 
system by van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2009; Saiegh, 2009; Kohlscheen, 2010, fiscal deficits 
by Schuknecht et al., 2009, (von Hagen, Schuknecht, & Wolswijk, 2011), volatile economic 
fundamentals and financial markets by Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010; and quality of 
institutions by Faria et al., 2011.  
Elections in majority of developing countries tended to affect the cost and availability of credit 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Goldsmith (1994) expected democratization efforts to promote greater 
                                                          
6 The classic common pool problem in economics is about how the impact of just one 
fisherman extracting more fish on the amount of fish in the lake is small, but if there are lots 
of fishermen doing the same we have a problem. (Wren-Lewis, 2014)  
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political freedom and stability but instead he found no correlation with enhanced attractiveness 
for lending and investment purposes. Behaviour predicted by PBC theory matters to agencies 
that are assessing the creditworthiness of developing countries in and around election periods. 
In this context, Block and Vaaler (2004) found that elections are associated with greater 
frequency of sovereign credit downgrades. This leads to agencies viewing elections in 
developing countries negatively, which consequently led to a substantial premium being 
exerted on those seeking capital (Block and Vaaler, 2004).  
 
Erdem and Varli (2014) also examined the factors that CRAs consider when determining the 
ratings for emerging markets given the strong signalling effect that ratings have. They used a 
linear ordered response analyses on quarterly panel data of eight emerging countries - Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Turkey from 2002 to 2011 and 
found that the most relevant factors were budget balance/GDP, GDP per capita, governance 
indicators7 and reserves/GDP with a 93% success rate albeit observing a lag in the ratings. As 
a result of the observed lag in the ratings in Turkey for example, Erdem and Varli (2014) 
questioned whether the CRAs were reacting fast to bad news and slowly to good news.  
Ozturk (2014) studied six governance indicators that affect institutional quality in an attempt 
to identify which were responsible for (bias) low sovereign ratings that had the potential to 
disrupt proper functioning financial systems. Using an ordered response model, he found that 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality caused a variation in institutional quality 
among the 106 countries studied and this contributed to the lower credit ratings they received 
between 1999 and 2010. Maltritz and Molchanov (2014) using Bayesian Model Averaging 
found that GDP growth and external debt to GDP ratio were the most important determinants 
of credit ratings for 31 emerging and 19 developed economies and that these factors played a 
vital role in influencing their default risk. Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) conducted a study 
using an ordered response model on 25 developed and 70 developing countries over the period 
1961 to 1999 and found that of all economic variables considered, on average, GNP per capita 
and inflation seemed to be the most relevant quantitative inputs into sovereign rating decisions 
(Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). He added that the weight assigned to different economic and 
financial indicators by CRAs depended on if the country is a highly-rated country and has a 
                                                          
7 Governance Indicators are: Control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of 




long institutional stability history or is a low rated country that is still undergoing rapid 
structural change (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). In addition to the two variables above, the 
current account balance and level of foreign reserves played an important role in determining 
the sovereign ratings of low rated countries.  
Cantor and Packer (1996) using a cross-section analysis and an OLS regression technique on 
49 developed and developing countries found that the six important factors used by Moody’s 
and S&P are: per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, level of economic 
development, and default history. These findings are consistent with the findings by Eliasson 
(2002) which show that the same set of variables are significant in ratings determination though 
she only used S&P credit ratings in a static and dynamic context for emerging markets. 
Similarly, Rowland (2004) used the same variables as Cantor and Packer (1996) but focused 
only on developed economies. His findings showed that the important factors for Moody’s and 
S&P are: GDP per capita, the economic growth rate, the inflation rate, external-debt ratios, 
debt-service ratios, the level of international reserves, and the openness of the economy. Both 
studies found GDP per capita and debt ratio to be significant.  
Gultekin-Karakas et al (2011) used a random effect ordered probit model for a mix of 93 
developing and developed countries between 1999 and 2010 and found inconsistencies in 
ratings issuance; for example, they found that low-income countries received lower ratings 
with a similar distinction when it came to OECD versus non-OECD countries. Afonso (2003) 
used cross-section data from 81 developing and developed markets. He employed a linear, 
logistical and exponential transformation of S&P and Moody’s rating levels and found that: (1) 
GDP per capita, (2) external debt-to-exports ratio, (3) level of economic development, (4) 
default history, (5) real growth rate, and (6) inflation rate as important factors. Evidence in this 
study shows that external debt and external reserves are more relevant for low-rated and 
developing countries while inflation was profound for high rated countries (Afonso, 2003).  
There are also other studies that investigated the link between political variables and sovereign 
risk. For example, Citron and Nickelsburg (1987), Brewer and Rivoli (1990) and Balkan (1992) 
all found political stability to be statistically significant in explaining the probability of 
sovereign default. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2004) using a non-parametric technique found 
politics to be relevant in explaining sovereign defaults on external and domestic debt 




Kohlscheen (2006) finds that higher political turnover per se increases the likelihood of 
sovereign default in 72 democracies excluding Latin America and OECD countries between 
1976 and 2000. Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) looked at how the political process of a country, as 
characterized by political instability and polarization, can impact sovereign interest rate 
spreads. They found that countries subject to larger political uncertainty and stronger domestic 
disagreement face a higher default risk premium in international credit markets. 
Based on the above literature review, this study has illustrated the development of PBC 
research in countries of different economic and political standings. It has proceeded to provide 
evidence of the link present between PBCs and credit rating action in various economies. The 


















Chapter 5 – Data and Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a detailed description of the data and the methodology that is followed 
by this study. Before discussing the appropriate method(s) to be used in this current study, it 
will explain the data types that are used, covering their sources and the time frame for which 
the study is focusing on in section 5.2. Thereafter, section 5.3 and 5.4 get into an explanation 
of the models and estimation techniques adopted for this study, citing previous literature that 
have also applied the same methodologies. The explanation will cover the hypotheses that the 
study aims to test, the applicable equations and the variables that make up the equations i.e. 
dependent versus independent. Lastly, section 5.5 will discuss the estimation strategy. 
5.2 Data  
 
This study makes use of three types of data: Macroeconomic data, Election Data and Credit 
Rating Data with each data type and source explained in the sub sections below. 
5.2.1 Macroeconomic Data 
 
Prior research by Cantor and Packer (1996a, b), Larrain et al. (1997) and McNamara and Vaaler 
(2000) used various macro-economic variables to determine whether they explain the variation 
in agency sovereign ratings for both industrialized and developing countries in the 1980s and 
1990s. Similarly, Block and Vaaler (2004) and Vaaler, Schrage and Block (2006) also used 
macroeconomic data based on a sample of 19 developing countries which included Brazil, 
Russia and South Africa for the period from 1987 to 2000. Consistent with the studies above, 
this study also uses macro-economic variables to examine if they explain the presence of PBC 
and consequently the variation in CRAs’ sovereign ratings of the BRICS countries. The annual 
data for each of the macroeconomic variables was collected from the World Bank’s database 
for World Development Indicators (WDI) for the period from 1994 to 2014 for BRICS. The 
macro-economic variables considered for the purpose of this study are briefly explained below:  
 Broad Money Growth (BMG), which represents the annual growth of the sum of 
currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central government, 
foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government as well 
as other securities such as certificates of deposit and commercial paper.  
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 Current Account Balance (CAB), which is the sum of balance of trade (exports minus 
imports of goods and services), net factor (primary) income e.g. interest and dividends 
and net transfer payments (secondary income) e.g. foreign aid.  
 External balance on goods and services (EXTBAL), which represents the difference 
between the exports of goods and services and imports of goods and services relative 
to GDP.   
 External Debt (EXTDEBT), which refers to the sum of short-term, long-term public 
sector, public and publicly guaranteed and private non-guaranteed debt relative to GDP.   
 Fiscal Balance (FISCBAL), which refers to the annual overall budget balance 
(government tax revenue less government final consumption expenditure) relative to 
GDP for the current year 
 GDP growth (GDPG), which represents the annual real GDP growth rate.  
 GDP per capita growth (GDPCG) represents the growth of the annual real GDP relative 
to the number of people in the country.  
 General government final consumption expenditure (GFCE), which refers to the 
government’s final expenditure relative to GDP. 
 Government tax revenue (GREV) refers to compulsory transfers to the central 
government for public purposes. Excludes certain compulsory transfers such as fines, 
penalties, and most social security contributions. Treats refunds and corrections of 
erroneously collected tax revenue as negative revenue. 
 Inflation (INF), which represents the average annual consumer price inflation. 
 Unemployment (UNEMP) refers to the national estimate of the share of the labor force 
that is without work but which is available for and seeking employment.  
Real Interest Rate (RIR), refers to the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator.   
 
5.2.2 Electoral Data 
In addition to macro-economic variables, this study also uses electoral data. The Electoral data 
for BRICS was sourced from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI) for 
the period from 1994 to 2014. The focus for this study is solely on presidential elections 
because “they present a more direct threat to power and are more relevant in a political context” 
(Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). All the countries sampled have fixed-term presidencies from 
1994 to 2014, which addresses the concern around the potential bias that could occur to our 
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estimates if elections were endogenous i.e. if politicians / governments could call elections 
when the economic conditions were favorable (Block, Ferree, & Singh, 2003). The only 
country in our study to have founding elections worth noting is South Africa which held its 
first ever democratic elections on 27th April 1994. The data set includes 22 multiparty 
presidential elections held as follows: 6 in Brazil, 5 in Russia, 4 in India, 2 in China and 5 in 
South Africa.  
The information from the database that is relevant for this study is: Election year, incumbent 
government party/candidate, winning party/candidate and where applicable, whether the 
aforementioned parties were either left or right wing.  
The Election year is captured as a dummy variable (ELECYR) and it takes a value of “1” when 
there were elections during a particular year else “0” when there were no elections for a given 
year. Other studies coded the election data differently to the above. For example, McCallum 
(1978) took a different approach with the electoral variable by increasing it by 1 every quarter 
from the time an incumbent got into office until about their 3rd year in office, then decreasing 
it by 1 so that it is back at 1 or 0 in the quarter when elections are held and the incumbent either 
gets re-elected or loses. He then conducted tests to find correlations between the electoral 
variables and residuals from autoregressive-moving average (ARMA) models run on the 
macroeconomic variables. However, this study does not replicate this as it makes use of annual 
data.  
The party orientation variable as per the DPI takes the following values: 1 = Right, 3 = Left, 2 
= Center, 0 = No information and NA = No executive.  
The right for this study represents parties that are defined as conservative, republican or fascist, 
or right wing.  The left represents parties that are defined as communist, socialist, democrat, or 
left-wing while the center represents parties that are defined as centrist or parties whose 
position can best be described as centrist (e.g. party advocates strengthening private enterprise 
in a social-liberal context). Parties can also be described as centrist if competing factions 






5.2.3 Credit Rating Data 
 
This is the data relating to long term sovereign credit ratings. The credit ratings data used for 
this study was sourced from Trading Economics and verified against the ratings posted on the 
sites of the CRAs. Particular focus was on the annual credit ratings that are published by 
Standard and Poor Global Ratings (S&P), Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s) and Fitch 
Ratings Inc. (Fitch). This study uses ratings from these three CRAs as they have dominance in 
the industry, specifically the sovereign rating segment. They also have the broadest country 
coverage that is complemented by a large pool of analysts globally. Furthermore, when 
combined, they have the largest market share of ratings for individual bond issuances.  
Consistent with prior studies that looked at the determinants of credit ratings, this study adopts 
a linear transformation over a non-linear transformation to quantify the rating categories. 
According to Pretorius and Botha (2017), a linear transformation’s main assumption is that the 
distance between rating categories is the same. Consistent with Cantor and Packer (1996), the 
credit ratings are transformed into an ordinal linear scale of 17 points as shown below:  
16 = AAA, 15= AA+, 14 = AA, 13 = AA-, 12 = A+, 11 = A, 10 = A-, 9 = BBB+, 8 = BBB, 7 
= BBB-, 6 = BB+, 5 = BB, 4 = BB-, 3 = B+, 2 = B, 1 = B- and 0 = C. 
The final sample comprises of 315 ratings published by 3 agencies for 5 countries that hold 
22 presidential elections. This study acknowledges that rating changes happen at different and 
multiple times in a year for the focus countries, hence, to avoid inconsistency, this study uses 
each country’s rating at the end of the 4th quarter (31 December) for the purpose of the analysis. 
The tables below provide a description of the ratings by the three main rating agents as well as 










Table 6: Summary of credit rating levels as set by the 3 main CRAs in the World  








Table 7: Sovereign risk ratings on long term foreign denominated debt from the 3 main CRA 
presented in a 17-point scale  
 
 
Fitch Moody’s S&P 
16 AAA Aaa AAA 
15 AA+ Aa1 AA+ 
14 AA Aa2 AA 
13 AA- Aa3 AA- 
12 A+ A1 A+ 
11 A A2 A 
10 A- A3 A- 
9 BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 
8 BBB Baa2 BBB 
7 BBB- Baa3 BBB- 
6 BB+ Ba1 BB+ 
5 BB Ba2 BB 
4 BB- Ba3 BB- 
3 B+ B1 B+ 
2 B B2 B 
1 B- B3 B- 
0 CCC Caa1 CCC+ 
 
5.3 Hypothesis development 
 
Following from the discussion of the theoretical frameworks and models of PBCs in chapter 3 
above, the opportunistic model would be the most appropriate model for the analysis of results. 
A deterrent from using the partisan model is because it is rooted in the idea of left-right 
ideological differences in parties with varying preferences for inflation and unemployment 
(Kaplan, 2006). Party distinctions are not clearly identifiable in emerging and frontier countries 
and this is the main reason why this study excludes party orientation in the regression model.  
Given that this study is organized into two parts, the first part shall examine whether PBCs 
around election years affect real economic outcomes in BRICs economies while the second 
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part examines whether election years and the evidence of PBC play a role in influencing 
sovereign rating action that BRICS received for the period under consideration. 
Testing for Hypothesis 1 
Firstly, based on evidence from prior literature, the study assumes that election years are 
associated with higher political risk explained by a strong presence of political business cycles 
(PBCs). The evidence of PBCs is identified by observing the changes in specific 
macroeconomic outcomes in the periods leading up to and after elections. Based on the 
argument above, hypothesis 1 tests the following: 
H0: Election years do not affect real economic outcomes and are not the cause of PBCs in 
BRICS 
H1: Election years are the likely cause for a strong presence of PBCs in BRICS 
To address the above arguments this study examines each macroeconomic intervention with a 
specification that takes the form of: 
 
Therefore, for this study, the dependent variable (y i, t) will be one of the eleven macroeconomic 
variables described above. The independent variables are: the lag of the dependent variable (y 
i, t -1), election year dummy variable (ELEi, t), the post-election year dummy variable (ELEPOST 
i, t) and the error term (u i, t). The information relating to the independent variables is coded as 
shown above.  
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The objective is that each of the macro economic variables will be tested against the 
independent variables for evidence of a PBCs in BRICS. This test is conducted on macro-
economic variables that are relevant in fiscal policy formation (fiscal balance, current account 
balance, external balance on goods and services, government expenditures and revenues) and 
monetary policy setting (inflation, real interest rates, and broad money growth). 
Consistent with suggestions in previous studies, the lagged values of the dependent variable 
(LDVs) are used for this part of the study. Lagged values of the dependent variable are 
important in the ARMA context as future dependent variables are influenced by their historical 
values (Kaplan, 2008). Furthermore, as suggested by Kaplan (2008), LDVs aid in accounting 
for any partial and autocorrelation in the data, hence, capturing any inertial effects in the 
macroeconomic variables and accounting for any unobserved factors that may explain 
differences in the macroeconomic variable over time.  The LDV is an annual variable, and 
though a ‘blunt indicator’, it is still appropriate for this analysis as it reflects the same 
frequency, with which the agencies review their country ratings (Block & Vaaler, 2004). In 
addition to the LDVs, the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) was used to determine the 
appropriate number of lags (k) on the dependent variation.  
However, one of the problems that arises in prior studies is that there could be potential 
endogeneity.  The problem of endogeneity comes about as a result of the election dummy 
variable having a biased coefficient estimate due to the timing of elections not being fixed and 
also because political leaders have the power to call elections at a time of their choice. 
Furthermore, endogeneity could be as a result of another set of unobserved variables affecting 
both the timing of elections and the macroeconomic variable outcomes. Specific to this study, 
the problem of endogeneity is eliminated by the fact that for BRICS, how and when to call an 
election is determined in the constitution unless in the instance when an incumbent steps down 
before the end of their term in which case the constitution stipulates that the successor can 
either continue with that term or seek a new mandate from voters. Block and Vaaler (2004) 
further advocated the use of the GMM estimator as it allows control for potential bias arising 
from endogeneity.  
Given the presence of a lagged dependent variable (LDV) alongside the panel data used in the 
study, the estimation method that best suits this study is the GMM as proposed by Block and 
Vaaler (2004) and Arellano and Bond (1991). The GMM estimator is an instrumental variables 
approach and it deals with the concern of possible endogeneity associated with elections though 
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all the countries sampled have fixed electoral terms. It selects the estimates that minimize the 
quadratic form of moment conditions and gets as close as possible to solving the over-identified 
system in the case where we have more sample moment conditions than we have parameters 
(Block, 2002). The OLS cannot be used as it fails to control for country-specific unobserved 
effects over the sample period. The Fixed Effects (FE) model (within groups) would have been 
preferred as per Hausman tests conducted over the Random Effects (RE) model. However, the 
FE model is still not a good fit for this study as its estimates could be potentially biased by 
LDVs which have turned out to be significant as results below will show (Klein & Sakurai, 
2015). Upon evaluating both the robust and non-robust GMM estimation models, this study 
will make use of the latter model which is non-robust to heteroskedasticity as used in the 
previous works by Arellano and Bond (1991).  
Testing for Hypothesis 2 
The second part of this study aims to find a possible link between the macroeconomic variables 
that are tested for PBC evidence in BRICS and the credit rating action that BRICS receive 
around election years. This led to the development of hypothesis 2 which is set out as follows: 
H0: Election years do not play a role in influencing sovereign rating action for BRICS?  
H2: Election years are associated with a higher likelihood of (negative) sovereign rating action 
for BRICS? 
CRAs take into account political risk amongst other risk indicators, when determining ratings 
for sovereigns. Election years, especially in developing and frontier markets, tend to be viewed 
negatively as heightened political uncertainty around the outcome leads to a higher possibility 
of a downgrade or a negative outlook. Therefore, guided by the prior works by Block and 
Vaaler (2004), the equation that is appropriate for this study is presented below as follows: 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑗𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡  
8
𝑗=1
+  𝜂𝑖𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑌𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡                (2) 
In order to explain these annual rating levels, this current study uses the variables: i is for the 
country and t for the year. The rating is as per the ordinal scale described above (0 – 16) as 
assigned by either of the three CRAs to each of the member countries of BRICS over the 
duration between 1994 and 2014.  The rating agency is not used as one of the control variables 
because tests are conducted based on each individual rating agency’s ratings for all the 
countries separately (refer to Table 21). 
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The right-hand side of the equation contains the independent variables which are the: LDV 
(Rating it-1), a vector of macro variables, dummy variables to account for the unobserved and 
characteristic effects related to the election year and the error term.  
The macroeconomic variables selected for use in this part of the analysis were based on two 
criteria: variables found significant in providing evidence of PBC and determining credit 
ratings in prior empirical literature and variables we believe CRAs consider when they assign 
ratings. The variables that shall be used to test for hypothesis 2 are: GDP per capita (expected 
to be positively related to the credit rating), Broad Money Growth (expected to be positively 
related to the credit rating), Current Account Balance (a deficit is expected to be negatively 
related to credit rating while a surplus is expected to be positively related to the credit rating), 
Government Revenue (expected to be positively related to the credit rating), Inflation (expected 
to be negatively related to the credit rating), Fiscal Balance (positively related to credit rating 
if it is positive and negatively related to credit rating if it is negative), External Balance 
(positively related to credit rating if it is positive and negatively related to credit rating if it is 
negative) and External Debt (expected to be negatively related to the credit rating assigned). It 
is important that the variables picked can be influenced by both fiscal or monetary policy action 
which is central to opportunistic PBC theory.   
Estimation Strategy  
The dependent variable is a rating level between 0 and 16 and is thus ordinal. This makes the 
case for using an ordered probit regression model although it is not possible to control for 
unobserved country heterogeneity since no model can provide such explanations. (Eliasson, 
2002) . Using this model over a linear regression is preferred because the latter implicitly 
assumes that the difference between one ordinal point (1) and another (2) is the same between 
the one ordinal point (2) and the next (3) and that assumption cannot hold for this study.   
The above sections have laid out the foundation for our analysis by expounding on the data 
types, the hypotheses the study aims to prove and the empirical methods that shall be used. 
The chapter to follow lays out the results, clearly explaining the outputs obtained and 
interpreting their meanings and how they add value to the objectives of this study. 
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Chapter 6 – Results 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is structured as such, section 6.2 explains the descriptive statistics for the data 
collected and used on the 11 macroeconomic variables from 1994 to 2014 for BRICS. Section 
6.3 will discuss the results from running model 1 in Chapter 5 above to investigate hypothesis 
1 (evidence of PBC in BRICS as tested for through macroeconomic changes around election 
years) and then section 6.4 will discuss results from running model 2 to test the link between 
PBC and credit rating action as identified by changes in macroeconomic variables.  
6.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the macroeconomic variables for Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa (1994 – 2014) 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation  
n  
Broad money growth (annual %) 32.59569 107.9572 105 
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.75508 4.326219 105 
External balance on goods and services (% of GDP)  2.103405 4.917482 105 
External Debt (% of GDP) 34.93836 18.74811 105 
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -0.31696 5.660512 105 
GDP growth (annual %) 5.0733 4.208616 105 
GDP per capita growth (annual %)  3.981498 4.276007 105 
General government final consumption expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
16.33807 3.33183 105 
Government tax revenue (% of GDP) 16.02111 5.982389 105 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)  33.35629 204.4677 105 
Real interest rate (%)  11.66031 19.1128 101 
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) 
(national estimate)  
9.49619 7.623422 105 
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Table 8 above presents summary data on the macroeconomic variables used for BRICS. The 
statistics above explain why one cannot classify the bloc as either a developing or developed 
‘economy’ though it does display features that are usually associated with frontier economies.  
The broad money growth for BRICS averages to 33% for 105 observations though this metric 
is likely to have been skewed by Brazil’s broad money growth which was at 1 102% in 1994 
before dropping to 44% in 1995 (World Bank, 2017) as per figure 1 in the appendix. The 
current balance (% of GDP) has an average of 0.76% for 105 observations, the high positive 
balances in Russia and China are evened down to 0.76% by low balances in Brazil, India and 
South Africa as shown in Figure 2. The external balance on goods and services as % of GDP 
has an average of 2.1% for 105 observations, Russia and China drive the positive metrics with 
all-time highs of 20% and 9.5% respectively while the other 3 countries maintained low figures, 
with India having the lowest balance in 2012 (-6.5%) as shown in Figure 3. External debt as a 
% of GDP averages at 35% for 105 observations with all the countries illustrating an increasing 
trend since 1994 although China’s pace has been higher than its counterparts as shown in Figure 
4. GDP growth and GDP per capita growth averaged 5% and 4% respectively with 105 
observations each. China’s growth supported the group with a high of (+14.2%) in 2007 while 
Russia had the lowest growth in 1994 of (-12.57%) as shown in Figure 5.  
Government Consumption expenditure as a % of GDP averaged to 16.4% for 105 observations. 
Russia has had consistently high expenditures over the years, closely followed by Brazil and 
South Africa while China and India’s governments have kept their expenditure at below 17% 
and 13% respectively over the 20-year time frame as shown in Figure 7. The tax revenue as a 
% of GDP averaged out to 16% for 105 observations with South Africa maintaining 
consistently high tax revenues of above 20% while India and China kept their levels around 
10% as shown in Figure 8. Inflation averaged out to 33% for 105 observations though this 
mean is biased due to Brazil’s 1994 inflation high of 2076% that dropped drastically in 1995, 
vastly different from the 2014 levels for BRICS that ranged between 2% (China) and 8% 
(Russia) as shown in Figure 9. The real interest rate averaged out to 12% for 101 observations, 
boosted up by the +20% interest rates that Brazil had over the 20 years and evened up by Russia 
that had 10 years (1998 to 2008) of negative interest rates with a record low of (-19%) in 1999 
as shown in Figure 10. Unemployment averaged to 9.5% for 105 observations, with SA having 
levels over 20% from year 2000 onwards, followed closely by Brazil and Russia that have had 
levels above 5% but below 15%. India and China have maintained consistently low levels of 
unemployment as shown in Figure 11.  
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6.3 Political Business Cycle Results  
 
The results below are based on the regression of each macroeconomic control variable on the 
LDV and the election and post-election dummy variables based on OLS, Fixed Effects (within 
groups) and GMM estimates. The heteroskedastic-consistent (white) standard errors are shown 
in parenthesis and the coefficients on LDVs are omitted in the tables of results below. GMM 
results reported in the tables are two-step estimators with instruments based on the assumption 
that elections are pre-determined rather than strictly exogenous (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
Broad Money Growth 
Results in Table 9 show that broad money growth is statistically significant in the post-election 
year at the 1% level in the GMM model. The GMM estimate indicates that broad money growth 
is positively related to elections. Broad money growth is likely to increase substantially by a 
6.24-percentage point in the post-election year. This finding defies traditional PBC theory, 
which predicts that BMG should fall, or fair negatively after elections. The observation here 
suggests that in BRICS, governments upon election / re-election will foster and push for 
expansionary monetary policies that cause an increase in money growth.  
One reason for this could be due to the influx in FDI on the back of the positive light in which 
the international community views successful elections. BRICS show monetary policy 
independence and so investors do not expect any tampering with those policies, and so will 
increase investments should elections end with no qualms. It is with this similar thinking that 
(Drazen, 2000) sought to look for political budget cycles induced by fiscal policy manipulation 
around election times. Another reason for that increase in money supply may be due to the 
existing high interest rates that compel investors to increase their foreign deposits in BRICS. 
A period of high interest rates is associated with low inflation levels which also defies PBC 









A. Broad Money Growth (BMG) 
Independent Variables OLS Fixed effects GMM GMM-robust 
ELECYR 0.863 -3.367* -1.039 -1.039 
 (3.497) (1.407) (2.235) (1.736) 
ELECYRPOST 7.522 4.597 6.245*** 6.245 
 (5.372) (5.463) (2.148) (5.640) 
     
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.297 0.187   
Wald test 0.198 0.198 0.00663 0.0815 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value) 
 
  0 0 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Current Account Balance 
Results in Table 10 show that the current account balance is statistically significant in the 
election year at the 5% level in GMM and the 10% level in OLS. The GMM estimates show 
that there is a positive relationship between elections and the current account balance. The 
current account balance is observed to increase by a 1.01-percentage point in the election year. 
This coincides with PBC theory as an improvement in the current account balance is an 
indicator of competence in managing the government’s resources. As incumbents target low 
inflation levels in the lead up to elections as PBC literature illustrated (Grier, 1989), it will 
create a favorable exchange rate fostering consumer spending and increased imports which are 
favorable for BRICS which are mostly exporting countries except for China that is both a large 
importer and exporter.  
Table 10 
B. Current Account Balance 









 (0.576) (0.667) (0.473) (0.652) 
ELECYRPOST 0.928 0.546 0.714 0.714 
 (0.714) (0.574) (0.458) (0.586) 
     
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.837 0.527   
Wald test 0.946 0.360 0.603 0.343 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value)   0.00482 0.00482 




External Balance on Goods and Services  
Results in table 11 show that there is no significant relationship between the external balance 
on goods and services and elections for all three estimators. This finding could be due to 
incumbents not having a direct hand in controlling the flow of goods and services. As discussed 
in (Bove, Efthyvoulou, & Navas, 2016), incumbents will target current expenditure that is 
visible and has immediate results and benefits (social welfare programs, unemployment and 
old age benefits) to the electorate. 
Table 11 
C. External Balance on goods and services 
Independent Variables OLS Fixed 
effects 
GMM GMM-robust 
ELECYR 0.495 0.420 0.520 0.520 
 (0.446) (0.410) (0.421) (0.397) 
ELECYRPOST 0.345 0.0639 0.185 0.185 
 (0.674) (0.462) (0.405) (0.489) 
     
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.891 0.566   
Wald test 0.837 0.206 0.509 0.150 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value)   0.000363 0.000363 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
External Debt  
Results in Table 12 show that external debt is statistically significant in the election year at the 
5% level in OLS but not in Fixed Effects and GMM. The OLS estimate shows a negative 
relationship between elections and external debt. Election periods are associated with a decline 
in external debt by about 5.2 percentage points in the election year. This finding is in line with 
PBC theory, because incumbents refrain from taking on external debt to supplement tax and 
other revenues necessary for current expenditure and campaigning. This also signals 
competency to voters as it shows that the government is managing their current resources well 
and need not take on more external debt. It is likely that reducing external debt seems more 
lucrative to incumbents at a time when low inflation policies are in place, to reduce the interest 
charges on the debt before and during the election period. Future interest charged on the debt 





D. External Debt 
Independent Variables OLS Fixed effects GMM GMM-robust 
ELECYR -5.192** -4.469 -3.908 -3.908 
 (2.493) (4.278) (2.665) (3.542) 
ELECYRPOST -0.643 0.123 0.650 0.650 
 (2.401) (2.076) (2.613) (2.136) 
     
Observations 90 90 90 90 
R-squared 0.823 0.613   
Wald test 0.184 0.466 0.150 0.363 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value)   0.216 0.216 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Fiscal Balance  
Results in table 13 show that there is no relationship between the fiscal balance and elections 
for all three estimators. This finding goes against empirical findings from studies done on 
developing economies by Ames (1987), Block (2002), Gonzalez (2002), Schuknecht (1996) 
and Shi & Svensson, (2000) who found PBCs as evidenced by pre-election expansion and post-
election contraction in fiscal deficits. The case of BRICS may be different owing to the fact 
this group of countries have distinct levels of government revenues, revenue sources and 
expenditure. Furthermore, the member states are independently marred by issues such as 
corruption and fund misappropriation by governments, though it probably occurs over the 
terms of the ruling governments and not specifically around election time.  
Table 13 
E. Fiscal Balance 
Independent Variables OLS Fixed effects GMM GMM-robust 
ELECYR 0.0657 0.170 -0.0889 -0.0889 
 (0.521) (0.366) (0.584) (0.310) 
ELECYRPOST -0.571 -0.377 -0.654 -0.654** 
 (0.463) (0.290) (0.561) (0.331) 
     
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.903 0.710   
Wald test 0.233 0.298 0.420 0.181 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value)   0.642 0.642 






Results in table 14 show that there is no relationship between the GDP growth and elections 
for all three estimators. This finding is expected as the electoral effect is usually short term - 
lasting anywhere from 1 to 3 months excluding campaigning time. Election dates and years are 
public information and so the event is not likely to have any direct impact on the GDP growth 
of a sovereign.   
Table 14 
F. GDP Growth 
Independent Variables OLS Fixed effects GMM GMM-robust 
ELECYR -0.408 -0.271 -0.488 -0.488 
 (0.623) (0.798) (0.860) (0.529) 
ELECYRPOST 0.313 -0.191 -0.390 -0.390 
 (0.663) (1.064) (0.832) (0.965) 
     
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.646 0.138   
Wald test 0.261 0.923 0.924 0.915 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value)   0.590 0.590 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
GDP Per Capita Growth 
Results in table 15 show that there is no relationship between the GDP Per Capita Growth 
and elections for all three estimators. This finding is similar to that of GDP growth above 
because of the short - lived electoral effect that doesn’t get to impact the population growth. 
Economic activity remains unchanged around election periods. 
Table 15 
G. GDP per capita growth 
Independent Variables OLS Fixed effects GMM GMM-robust 
ELECYR -0.365 -0.236 -0.409 -0.409 
 (0.643) (0.779) (0.867) (0.558) 
ELECYRPOST 0.362 -0.140 -0.318 -0.318 
 (0.689) (1.062) (0.839) (0.994) 
     
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.655 0.160   
Wald test 0.294 0.908 0.930 0.921 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value)   0.568 0.568 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Governmental Final Consumption Expenditure 
Results in Table 16 show that there is no relationship between the Government Final 
Consumption Expenditure and elections for all three estimators. This finding defies PBC theory 
and literature which found that in the lead up to elections, government consumption is expected 
to increase in a bid to incentivize voters to re-elect the ruling government / party for another 
term (Balaguer-Coll, Brun-Martos, Forte, & Tortosa-Ausina, 2015). An examination of the 
electoral outcomes in BRICS shows that the same parties have retained power for long periods 
of time and this consequently increased their re-election chances regardless of whether they 
manipulated consumption levels. Brender (2003) observed this phenomenon in Israel and 
termed it the “past support variable” for incumbent governments.  
Table 16 
H. Government Final Consumption Expenditure 
Independent Variables OLS Fixed effects GMM GMM-robust 
ELECYR -0.00968 -0.0853 -0.0212 -0.0212 
 (0.171) (0.166) (0.222) (0.102) 
ELECYRPOST -0.333 -0.215 -0.229 -0.229 
 (0.268) (0.354) (0.215) (0.315) 
     
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.942 0.401   
Wald test 0.237 0.565 0.437 0.439 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value)   0.144 0.144 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Government Tax Revenue 
Results in Table 17 show that the government tax revenue is statistically significant in the post-
election year at the 10% level in OLS but not in Fixed Effects or GMM. The OLS estimate 
shows that there is a negative relationship between elections and government tax revenue. 
Government tax revenue is expected to drop by 0.9% in the post-election year. The post-
election drop in government tax revenue is validated by prior PBC research by Tufte (1978) 
that found that unemployment rose in the post-election period due to short tenure of temporary 
jobs created in the pre-election period by governments’ in a bid to appease voters. A rise in 
unemployment and a spike in inflation in the post-election period as predicted by rational PBC 
theory, leads to reduction in the tax base, driven primarily by a fall in consumer demand and 
spending (Mourmouras & Tijerina, 1994). Alavirad (2004) found that in Iran’s inflationary 
period, the government expenditure grew faster than revenue, and in a bid to narrow the deficit, 




I. Government Tax Revenue 
Independent Variables OLS Fixed effects GMM GMM-robust 
ELECYR 0.0668 0.109 -0.0919 -0.0919 
 (0.455) (0.271) (0.555) (0.264) 
ELECYRPOST -0.896* -0.624 -0.860 -0.860 
 (0.524) (0.568) (0.533) (0.575) 
     
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.936 0.704   
Wald test 0.118 0.344 0.250 0.252 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value)   0.862 0.862 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Inflation 
Results in Table 18 show that the inflation is statistically significant in the post-election year 
at the 1% level in the GMM model. The GMM estimate shows that there is a positive 
relationship between the elections and inflation. Inflation is expected to spike by about 13 
percentage points in the post-election year as also observed in prior literature. Rational 
opportunistic theorists like Ergun (2000) explain that this increase in post-election inflation is 
a counter effect of politicians implementing expansionary monetary policies (low interest rates 
and rising money supply) in the pre-election period to appear competent (Block, 2002). The 
increase in inflation after elections could be the reversal of decreased tax rates before elections 
causing the governments to raise taxes and consequently making consumers to demand higher 
wages so that their disposable income can afford the now pricier goods and services.  
Table 18 
J. Inflation 
Independent Variables OLS Fixed effects GMM GMM-robust 
ELECYR 4.428 -0.959 2.068 2.068 
 (3.510) (0.897) (3.704) (1.945) 
ELECYRPOST 14.20 10.71 13.10*** 13.10 
 (9.841) (10.95) (3.560) (10.47) 
     
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.371 0.218   
Wald test 0.245 0.314 0.0130 0.197 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value)   0 0 





Real Interest Rate 
Results in Table 19 show that there is no relationship between the real interest rate and elections 
for all three estimators. This study concurs with this results as the real interest rate is a monetary 
policy tool that is set by the central bank or a monetary policy committee. Either of the two 
aforementioned parties should be independent of government influence and so elections are 
not supposed to have any bearing on their decisions and policy choices. However, as 
governments target fiscal policies that will keep inflation at low levels in the lead up to elections 
(Klose, 2012), low interest rate levels are desired so that people can access cheaper credit and 
the governments’ programs can have the greatest value-add. An expected result would have 
been rising interest rates in the post-election period as the contractionary effects of the pre-
election policies kick in, and the central banks have to curb borrowing levels and high inflation 
levels.    
Table 19 
K. Real Interest Rate 
Independent Variables OLS Fixed effects GMM GMM-robust 
ELECYR 3.045 3.158 2.853 2.853* 
 (2.072) (1.646) (2.305) (1.470) 
ELECYRPOST -2.620 -1.578 -0.831 -0.831 
 (2.367) (2.682) (2.295) (2.282) 
     
Observations 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.865 0.573   
Wald test 0.0523 0.308 0.192 0.273 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value)   0.637 0.637 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Unemployment  
Results show that there is no relationship between unemployment and elections for all three 
estimators. This result defies a large amount of empirical work on PBC, dating back from 
earlier works by Nordhaus (1975) to recent work by Kaplan (2008) who found that the 
unemployment rate drops in the lead up to elections and increases after the elections are over. 
The lack of electoral effects on unemployment levels could be due to incumbents opting to use 
social welfare programs to draw voters over temporary job creation measures. 
Table 20 
L. Unemployment Rate 
Independent Variables OLS Fixed effects GMM GMM-robust 
ELECYR -0.382 -0.180 -0.321 -0.321* 
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 (0.247) (0.210) (0.243) (0.177) 
ELECYRPOST 0.0684 0.159 0.0865 0.0865 
 (0.218) (0.158) (0.233) (0.140) 
     
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.988 0.668   
Wald test 0.0674 0.140 0.162 0.0272 
Number of Countries  5 5 5 
Sargan (p-value)   0.151 0.151 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overall, the findings from this study coincide with what thirty years of research has observed 
– that there is limited empirical support for traditional PBC theory as evidenced by no statistical 
significance in real GDP and unemployment fluctuations around elections (Alesina & Roubini, 
1992; Drazen, 2000).  
Furthermore, the results from this current study are consistent with the findings of Kaplan 
(2006) who found that policy alteration in developing countries did not have any “systematic” 
effect on macroeconomic indicators – specifically, real GDP growth, inflation and 
unemployment. Kaplan (2006) also found that the governments lacked the necessary capacity 
and this limited their ability to influence macroeconomic outcomes.  High levels of corruption, 
lack of skilled public service employees and an insufficient rule of law (Easterly, 2001) further 
aggravated the governments’ incapacity to affect macroeconomic variables. 
The next section provides further analysis based on examining the relationship between 
macroeconomic variables and LDVs to compare to the credit ratings the BRICS countries 
received during the period under study. The credit ratings used are those provided by the three 
main global rating agencies, that is, the S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. The aim is to identify if the 
same variables that influence the presence (or lack) of PBC are significant in determining the 
long-term credit rating level for the sovereign. The discussion of these results follows in the 
subsequent sections. 
6.4 Sovereign Ratings Model Results 
The entire data set shows that the average sovereign rating figures for BRICS are 7.2095 
(Fitch), 7.3430 (Moody’s) and 6.8 (S&P). This mean value is insightful because it means that 
all the countries in our sample have a rating around BBB- on average, which is the lowest 
investment grade rating, and before the first speculative rating, BB+. The average figures could 
pose the risk of misrepresentation because a country such as China has averaged a rating of 
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10.762 across the three CRAs while the worst performing counterpart, Brazil has averaged 
4.703, a junk status.  
The SIC recommended an auto regressive of order one for all the macroeconomic variables 
except for External Debt, for which an auto regressive of order two was recommended – the 
result of the auto regressive was that partial autocorrelation vanishes and autocorrelation 
diminishes to zero over time (Karakaş, 2013).  
Table 21 presents the non-robust GMM estimation results based on proposals by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) from the three CRAs that this study is focusing on. It presents a summary of 
results based on how the ratings provided by each of three major rating agencies were 
influenced by the macro economic variables and elections years. 
Table 21: Summary of results on how ratings are affected by macroeconomic variables in 
election years 
 
Variables  S&P Moody’s Fitch 




























































Observations 93 93 93 
Number of Countries 5 5 5 
AR2_test 0.921 0.892 0.316 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Based on the results in Table 21, it is evident that the election year dummy variable has a 
negative relationship with the credit ratings given, although it is not statistically significant at 
any level. This forms the basis for refuting hypothesis 2. According to the data available and 
figure 12 in the appendix, election years in BRICS were viewed mainly in an optimistic light 
by all three CRAs. There were thirteen sovereign rating upgrades during election years - 3 in 
Brazil (all took place in 2006) ,7 in Russia (2 in 1996, 2 in 2000, 2 in 2004 and 1 in 2008), 1 
in China (2003), 1 in India (2007) and 1 in South Africa (2009). Comparatively, there were 
seven downgrades in the election years – 3 in Brazil (1998, 2002 and 2014), 2 in Russia (2004 
and 2008) and 2 in South Africa (2014).   
The reason why CRAs have a positive sentiment about elections in BRICS and seem to trust 
the countries’ electoral systems and procedures, is because their political systems have over 
time proved to be reliable and free of manipulation. Additionally, any political turmoil around 
or as a result of elections has had minimal effect on the economic standing and activity of the 
countries. However, given that we are dealing with long-term sovereign ratings, CRAs are 
likely to only change their ratings in the case that a short-term event affects the long-term 
prospects of the economy. Elections didn’t seem to have a negative effect in the short term.   
For the purpose of analyzing the results for this study, the main focus shall specifically be on 
the output based on Moody’s rating over S&P and Fitch. The reason Moody’s makes for a good 
choice is that it has been the most active CRA in our sample countries as it accounts for 45% 
of election year rating changes in comparison to 30% by S&P and 25% by Fitch. The choice 
to analyze results based on the output obtained using the Moody’s rating is consistent with the 
pick made by Block and Vaaler (2004). However, results based on other rating agencies will 
be referred to and compared when necessary in order to enrich the findings of this study. 
A glance at the findings in Table 21 shows that the results of Moody’s and S&P are very similar 
in terms of variables that are statistically significant and those that are not.  The results based 
on the Moody rating agency do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis. They show that the 
electoral year does not affect the ratings that BRICS received. Therefore, there is not enough 
evidence to prove that elections in BRICS are associated with a (negative) change in sovereign 
ratings. The notable outcomes of our analysis are how the current account balance and the 
external debt levels significantly influence sovereign rating changes in election years. The two 




Current Account Balance 
Results have shown that the current account balance of BRICS has a positive relationship to 
the credit rating level. It is statistically significant at the 5% level in GMM and 1% level in 
Ordered Probit model with the LDV and election year DV incorporated. The results predict 
that Moody’s credit rating level is likely to be upgraded with an 18.1 percent probability and 
that of S&P by 24.6 percent due to the positive change in the current account balance level at 
the time. This finding coincides with the findings by Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005), who also 
found that an improvement in the current account balance is viewed positively by CRAs and 
thus increases the likelihood of the sovereign receiving a positive outlook or rating upgrade.  
 
External Debt  
Results indicate that the external debt levels of BRICS have a negative relationship to the credit 
rating levels of the countries in election years. This macroeconomic variable is found to be 
statistically significant at the 1% level across all the three main CRAs. Furthermore, the results 
show that during election years in BRICS, for high levels of external debt around election years, 
it is expected that the credit rating levels will be negatively affected by a 2.71 percent 
probability for Moody’s, 2.22 percent for S&P and 2.91 percent for Fitch. This finding is 
consistent with the studies conducted by Cantor and Packer (1996) using a sample on 49 
countries (mix of developed and developing economies), Afonso (2003) based on a sample of 
81 countries (mix of developed and developing economies) and Rowland (2004) based on a 
sample of developed economies only. A most recent study by Maltritz & Molchanov (2014) 
based on a mix of economies examined the impact of 28 independent variables on credit risk 
and found that external debt to GDP (a variable that is directly impacted by credit rating action) 
was significant in determining country credit risk. 
This macroeconomic variable is important because it highlights the size of obligations that the 
member states have to their lenders. With the pressure to ‘capture’ more voters through capital 
and social expenditure, governments find themselves turning to external debt sources to 
supplement the limited revenue they get from taxes and grants. The interest payable on this 
debt varies largely based on the current credit rating level of the country as this is the main 
indicator that lenders look at when deciding the interest rate to charge the sovereigns.  
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Elections, if not completed successfully, heighten the risk associated with meeting debt 
obligations and as such CRAs downgrade countries with a reputation of election dispute and 
post-election violence.  
The results and findings above have brought to light two crucial observations that apply to 
BRICS based on macroeconomic data collected from the period of 1994 to 2014. BRICS data 
suggests that there is mixed to little evidence in support of PBCs in BRICS and consequently, 
that only two macroeconomic variables (current account balance and external debt) were of 
significance to CRAs as they assigned credit ratings to BRICS.  Owing to these findings, the 




















Chapter 7 – Conclusion and suggestions for future research 
 
Empirical research on the presence of PBCs has grown extensively since the seminal papers by 
Nordhaus in 1975. The research was initially conducted on developed economies as their 
economic and political data was readily available and well documented. The evidence obtained 
in various studies based on developing economies showed limited evidence of traditional and 
partisan PBCs. The reasons provided for this weak evidence of PBC was that developed 
economies have controlled political systems and institutions that have been established for a 
long period, hence, making it impossible for incumbents to manipulate policy variables in their 
favour. This lack of evidence motivated academics to begin studies on developing countries 
especially those that were prominent for contentious elections and lengthy power struggles. 
Initial studies on developing countries formed the basis for opportunistic and rational 
opportunistic PBC theory which was found to be present in many developing economies in 
Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature through the two main objectives it aims to 
achieve. The first is that, this study investigated the presence of political business cycles in 
BRICS countries from 1994 to 2014. This evidence was sought for by analysing a historical 
dataset of macroeconomic control variables over a 20-year period with focus on the election 
and post-election changes. The second objective examined the relationship between elections 
and credit rating action by the three main CRAs – Moody’s, S&P ratings and Fitch Ratings on 
BRICS. The period chosen for this study is justified because all members of BRICS countries 
were Republics that could hold elections for the said years – in line with international standards. 
Furthermore, the period chosen represents a period when none of the participating countries 
were facing any sanctions, their economies were open to trade regionally and internationally 
and they were eligible to receive FDI and grants from international lending bodies.  
This study is unique because it focuses on four countries that had only been a trading bloc for 
about four years, before South Africa joined and then for eleven years in total at the time of 
writing.  The countries that make up BRICS have very distinct forms of governments and have 
been independent election holding sovereigns for varying periods. All but South Africa were 
independent before 1994 and their economies had been through multiple booms and recessions 
in line with the global economy. In addition, the BRICS countries can be a tricky to categorise 
as either developed or developing countries given the size of their economies against the 
population and income levels of majority of their citizens. Furthermore, member states all bring 
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valuable attributes to the bloc and this has caught the attention of the International community. 
It is believed that by 2050 or even earlier than that, BRICS is likely to be an economic super 
power capable of challenging the G20 – China is currently the second largest economy behind 
the US and its currency is now being used by the IMF as a reserve currency alongside the 
Dollar and the Euro.  
In line with the objectives of this study, the analysis conducted provides some findings worth 
welcoming for policy makers in BRICS countries. The findings suggest that BRICS as a bloc 
is not faced with a challenge that is associated with majority of developing economies – that 
is, political business cycles. Findings from this study are statistically insignificant for PBCs in 
BRICS. The findings show that there is weak evidence to support the claim that politicians in 
BRICS manipulate fiscal and monetary policies in order to appear competent and sway voters 
in their favour in the lead up to elections. This lack of PBC evidence may be testament to the 
fact that financial institutions within BRICS are strong, regulated accordingly in line with 
international standards and free of government interference. The results also suggest that unlike 
in most developing countries, elections in BRICS are not associated with heightened risk but 
are viewed as a period of peaceful power exchange with the new governments being expected 
to be better for the economies.  
A point worth noting also is that, in BRICS, the ruling parties were able to maintain their 
control of the government for substantial amounts of time.  This continuous tenure in office is 
likely to provide the governments enough time to deliver on medium and long term promises 
to voters and as such eliminate the possibility or need for manipulative behaviour come election 
time. It leaves the opposition parties at a disadvantage unless the ruling party really performs 
poorly on its commitments (without valid enough reasons) or is tangled up in multiple scandals 
that they cannot absolve themselves from before the elections period.  
To further complement previous research and the first set of findings for this study, the second 
analysis performed for this study found that there is no correlation between elections and credit 
rating actions that BRICS received between 1994 and 2014. Prior research found evidence that 
suggested that elections in developing countries than in developed economies, were viewed 
negatively by CRAs leading them to downgrade sovereigns around the said periods. CRAs had 
observed elections to be periods of heightened political risk which trickled down and 
manifested itself in macroeconomic variables, hence, causing the economy to perform poorly 
around the same time. As a result of this, the incoming government would find itself trying to 
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restore economic activity while having to deal with higher debt obligations than those their 
predecessors faced due to higher interest rates being charged because the nations had been 
downgraded during the election period.  
Overall, the results obtained in this study provide several potential extensions which can enable 
a better understanding of the economic capabilities and challenges that BRICS as a trading bloc 
is likely to face. A starting point could be to study a longer time frame beyond the 20-year 
period that this study focused on to identify any cross-country correlations in political and 
economic behaviour.  It is likely that some members of the Next 11 (N11) will express interest 
in joining the BRICS bloc and so research could be conducted on that group of countries in 
order to identify those that may be a suitable fit to join BRICS and not increase its overall risk 
as a trading bloc. As far as political risk is concerned, an extension to this study can test for the 
presence of PBC on a local government level, either focusing on municipalities or provincial 
government offices. A future study could also investigate the effects that other information 
such as opinion polls that becomes available towards elections has on the evidence of PBCs in 
BRICS. It would be interesting to test whether there is any correlation between the presidential 
term limits in BRICS and how this contributes to PBCs presence in the bloc. Another possible 
line of research would involve testing whether there is any spill over effects of political and/or 
economic risk among BRICS and if credit rating action in a member state has cross country 
effects on the rest in the bloc. Moreover, research on BRICS credit ratings could also be 
conducted using monthly or quarterly data so that any trends that may be evident over the 
course of a year can be observed. These issues are beyond the scope of this study and are 
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Figure 1: Broad money growth (annual %) (World Bank, 2017) 
 
 














Figure 5: GDP growth (annual %) (World Bank, 2017) 
 
 
































Figure 12: Credit ratings for BRICS and the changes from 1994 to 2014.  
 
 
